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PRIOR RESTRAINT BY THE BACKDOOR:
CONDITIONAL RIGHTS
STEVEN HELLE*
I. INTRODUcTION
T HE prior restraint doctrine has been variously described as a
doctrine "showing signs of age"' and having "outlived its useful-
ness,"2 yet it persists. Defense attorneys regularly attempt to cast
their speech and press cases in the prior restraint mold because the
label of prior restraint retains its talismanic significance.3 Perhaps
because of the imposing pedigree and impassable constitutional
hurdle, however, courts often are reluctant to extend the doctrine
to new situations and the speech at issue may be left uncat-
egorized-and thus unprotected. 4
This hesitancy on the part of the courts to expand the prior
restraint doctrine may explain why the words "prior restraint" ap-
pear nowhere in the case of Rust v. Sullivan,5 a case involving an
* Copyright Steven Helle, 1995. Associate Professor and Head, Department
ofJournalism, University of Illinois. B.S. 1976, MA., J.D. 1979, University of Iowa.
1. Jeffery A. Smith, Prior Restraint: Original Intentions and Modern Interpretations,
28 WM. & MARv L. REv. 439, 440 (1987).
2. Note, Prior Restraint-A Test of Invalidity in Free Speech Cases?, 49 COLUM. L.
REv. 1001, 1006 (1949), quoted in Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint,
20 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 648, 649 (1955).
3. Floyd Abrams, one of the country's best known media attorneys, said he
was very tempted to characterize everything he plausibly could as a prior restraint
because of the taboo associated with it. See Donald M. Gillmor, Prologue, 66 MINN.
L. Rxv. 1, 8 (1981) (summarizing Abrams' comments as moderator of Near v. Min-
nesota 50th Anniversary Symposium). Professor Kalven concurred: "[A] s a matter
of advocacy there is undoubtedly much 'good' language in the cases about the
presumption against prior restraint; it is still a great label to be able to attach to
what one is opposing." Harry Kalven, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1970 Term-Foreword:
Even When a Nation is at War, 85 HLv. L. REv. 3, 33 (1971) (citation omitted).
4. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2771-73 (1993) (stating
that "petitoner stretched the term 'prior restraint' well beyond the limits estab-
lished by our cases" and holding that destruction of entire inventory of sexually
explicit magazines and videotapes is not prior restraint after seven were found to
be obscene); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984) (stating that
protective order banning dissemination of discovered information before trial "is
not the kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First Amendment scru-
tiny"); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62-63 (1976) (holding
that zoning restriction on film exhibitors is not prior restraint); In re a Minor, 595
N.E.2d 1052, 1055 (1992) (finding "not persuasive" petitioner's argument that it is
unconstitutional prior restraint to order newspaper not to disclose names of juve-
nile victims of physical and sexual abuse).
5. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
(817)
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explicit ban on abortion counseling at family planning clinics re-
ceiving Title X funds from the government. The United States
Supreme Court ruled that the government could use its spending
power selectively to fund certain speech and, as a condition of ac-
cepting the money, require abstinence from any speech regarding
abortion.6 If government banned speech regarding abortion out-
right, it would be an unconstitutional prior restraint. The power of
the purse, however, enabled the state to achieve the same result
without constitutional objection.
Rust may represent the new breed of prior restraint, a form of
prior restraint by the backdoor. If courts allow the government to
use its largesse to condition the exercise of First Amendment rights,
the potential for governmental control is enormous. As the peti-
tioners in Rust suggested, grants for health, research and educa-
tion,7 subsidies for public forums, and entitlements for programs
such as Medicare, Medicaid and Veterans' Disabilities,8 to name just
a few,9 offer abundant possibilities as "instruments of censorship in
a marketplace dominated by government largesse." 10 It is particu-
larly troubling that the subject of the prior restraint in Rust was the
exercise of a constitutional right to abortion."1 Imagine public de-
fender offices subsidized by the state, "where lawyers are forbidden
to inform their clients of the right to remain silent and are forbid-
den to refer their clients to lawyers free to do So."12 Of course,
certain members of the Court may have viewed Rust as primarily an
abortion case. Thus, their general opposition to the abortion right
may have affected their vote regarding the First Amendment di-
mension of the case. 13 Nonetheless, questionable precedent is still
6. For a discussion of the holding of Rust, see infra notes 159-97 and accompa-
nying text.
7. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 2, Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (No.
89-1391).
8. Brief for Petitioners at 17, Rust (No. 89-1391).
9. For a discussion of other programs that could be used for purposes of cen-
sorship, see infra note 216:
10. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 2, Rust (No. 89-1391).
11. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992) (affirming
constitutional right to obtain abortion without undue interference from state);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that women have constitutional
right to abortion).
12. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 5 n.10, Rust (No. 89-1391).
13. The vote in Rust broke down roughly along the lines of the vote in Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Service, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), which narrowed the
scope of the protection afforded abortion by Roe. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote
the majority opinion in both Rust and Webster, and was joined in both by justices
White, Kennedy and Scalia. Justices Blackmun, the author of Roe, Marshall, and
Stevens dissented in both. Justice O'Connor joined the majority in Webster, but
818 [Vol. 39: p. 817
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precedent, and Rust may well have relegated the doctrine against
prior restraint to constitutional backwaters.
Questions regarding the scope and rationale of the prior re-
straint doctrine were not addressed in Rust, including: Whether
government should be able to impose conditions on the exercise of
a constitutional right and whether a citizen may waive a right to free
speech or press. This article examines the phenomenon heralded
by Rust and suggests the Court erred in overlooking the prior re-
straint doctrine as the critical issue. The article begins by exploring
the history and rationale of the prior restraint doctrine. Next, the
Article discusses Supreme Court cases that have applied the doc-
trine including illustrations of the Court's underlying premises.
The article then considers contrary premises as well as what First
Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams calls the "music" of Rust.14 Fi-
nally, the article concludes that the prior restraint doctrine should
be applied on a basis consistent with its historical and philosophical
premises.
II. No PREvious RESTRAINTS
Perhaps no academic debate regarding freedom of speech and
press has been as fervent as the one involving what the Framers
meant when they adopted the First Amendment. 15 The argument
essentially is whether the Framers merely meant that expression was
free if it could be published without a license, or whether they in-
tended freedom of expression to include freedom to publish with-
out government approval as well as freedom from penalty after
publication. In other words, whether the Framers intended to pro-
tect citizens' freedom from prior restraint and subsequent
punishment. 16
dissented in Rust. Justice Brennan had dissented in Webster, but his replacement
on the bench, Justice Souter, filled out the five-member majority in Rust.
14. For a discussion of Floyd Abrams' analysis of Rust, see infra text accompa-
nying note 239.
15. Leonard Levy recounted how a reviewer of a book written in response to
his first work in the field, Legacy of Suppression, "concluded that I had 'generated
about as much scholarship as anyone in recent memory.'" LEONARD W. LEVY,
EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS, at xxi (1985) (quoting Richard F. Hixson, American
Revolutionary Press Examined in New Collection of Essays, 7 JouRN. HIST. 114, 114
(1980) (reviewing THE PRESS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Bernard Bailyn &
John B. Hench eds., 1980))). In fact, "[p]rompted by the scholarship of Leonard
Levy, legal historians have begun re-examining contemporary sources on the press
clause and have opened a debate that should last for many years." JEFFERY A.
SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM-The Ideology of Early American Journalism
4 (1988).
16. As with all generalizations, this capsulization of the two camps merits fur-
1994] 819
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It is generally accepted that the Framers contemplated liability
after publication for damage to the reputation of private individu-
als. However, the more divisive issue is whether they also intended
to hold writers liable for statements tending to injure the govern-
ment's reputation-seditious libel.17 The narrow constructionists,
led by Leonard W. Levy, believe the Framers only intended to en-
dorse the English common law understanding of free speech.18
Their arguments inevitably quote from William Blackstone's Com-
ther explanation. Although Levy argued that freedom of the press meant only
freedom from prior restraint in his first book, a quarter century later he admitted
that he may have been wrong and that the Framers may also have had some proce-
dural protections regarding subsequent punishment in mind. LEvy, supra note 15,
at xi. He gave ground grudgingly, though, and contradicted his change of heart
later in the same book:
Even the Zengerian proposition that truth should be a defense against a
charge of seditious libel had no wide acceptance in 1789. The only sim-
ple acknowledged principle about freedom of the press in 1789 remained
Blackstonian in character: one had freedom to publish whatever he
pleased subject to his criminal liability for abusing that freedom. Id. at
323.
Passage of the Sedition Act in 1798 can be read as evidence that the Framers
confined themselves to protection from prior restraint only, but a closer look
reveals that the Act put a greater burden on the prosecution than Blackstone
would have contemplated. See id. at 13 n.23 (noting that Blackstone rejected "the
right of the defendant to prove the truth of his alleged libel"). The Act incorpo-
rated truth as a defense, allowed the jury to decide whether the expression was
seditious and required a showing of criminal intent rather than a "bad tendency."
Id. at 297. Levy noted, however, that the requirement of proving criminal intent
was an "empty protection." Id. at 151. Juries, he also wrote, "proved to be as sus-
ceptible to prevailing prejudices as judges when they decided the fate of defend-
ants who had expressed unpopular sentiments in times of crisis. Only one verdict
of 'not guilty' was returned in the numerous prosecutions under the Sedition Act
of 1798." Id. at 128. In fact, in an English case about the time of the Sedition Act,
a jury convicted despite the court's recommendation of acquittal. See id. at 286-87
(recounting story of Baptist minister who spoke in favor of French Revolutionary
ideals and was convicted despite court's recommendation of acquittal). Truth like-
wise proved to be an elusive protection. See id. at 129, 201-03, 303 (noting that
truth as defense is "illusory" and "cannot always be proved").
17. Levy cites the common law understanding of seditious libel as "any mali-
cious criticism about the government that could be construed to have the bad
tendency of lowering it in the public's esteem, holding it up to contempt or ha-
tred, or of disturbing the peace." Id. at 8; see also id. at 271 (stating legal definition
of seditious libel as "malicious, scandalous falsehoods of a political nature that
tended to breach the peace, instill revulsion or contempt in the people, or lower
their esteem for their rulers"). The Sedition Act of 1798 incorporated falsity into
the definition. See id. at 297 (stating "[t]he Sedition Act made criminal 'any false,
scandalous and malicious writings, utterance, or publications against the
government' ").
18. For a general discussion of Levy's views, see supra note 16. Professor Kurk-
land concurred with the narrow contructionists. See Philip B. Kurkland, The Irrele-
vance of the Constitution: The First Amendement's Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Press
Clauses, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1979-1980) (noting that "original and limited
meaning" of First Amendement included only freedom from prior restraint,
although this definition today "sounds too restrictive of liberty we cherish").
820
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol39/iss4/2
PRIOR RESTRAINT By THE BACK DOOR
mentaries on the Law of England, written in the late 1760s, more than
twenty years before the First Amendment:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a
free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints
upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for
criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an
undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before
the public: to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the
press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous,
or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own
temerity.1 9
The Commentaries were the standard reference for much of the
common law on both sides of the Atlantic, with an even greater
impact in this country, and were the most important legal work
since Justinian's Institutes fourteen centuries earlier.20 Levy there-
fore observed, in support of his narrow construction of freedom of
expression, that English common law was the basis for many of the
other amendments in the Bill of Rights,21 and that a number of
American writers both before and after the adoption of the First
Amendment endorsed the Blackstonian view of freedom of the
press. Levy concluded that the Framers intended to adopt the Eng-
lish common law understanding of freedom of the press in the First
Amendment.
Professor Jeffery Smith, who advocated a broader understand-
ing of the First Amendment, responded that "Levy's thesis stumbles
19. 4 WrLLm BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151"52, quoted in LEw, supra note
15, at 12-13. The broad constructionists cited the passage from Blackstone in their
arguments as well, but with less sympathy. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 61-62, 66
(commenting on Federalist and Republican attempts to characterize Blackstone's
works during period of Sedition Act controversy). In drafting the Bill of Rights,
the Senate rejected text that expressly would have adopted the Blackstonian inter-
pretation of a free press. See id. at 70 (discussing legislative history of Bill of
Rights). Levy, however, interprets the defeat of the motion as ambiguous because
the rationale could have been that the conception of freedom was too narrow or
that the language was unnecessary in the sense of being superfluous. LEw, supra
note 15, at 262.
20. DANIELJ. BOORSTIN, THE MvSTmOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAw 3 (Beacon Press
edition, 1958); see also JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY
162-63 (1992) (examining Blackstone's popularity among American thinkers). Ac-
cording to Boorstin, the Commentaries were exceeded only by the Bible in their
impact on American institutions. BOORsTIN, supra, at iii (preface to Beacon Press
edition).
21. LEvy, supra note 15, at 324. The common law of England before the
Revolution was expressly adopted by twelve states unless it conflicted with a statu-
tory provision of that state. Id. at 197.
19941
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on crucial points."2 2 He argued that England's common law con-
cept of freedom of the press was fundamentally inconsistent with
the principles of the.United States Constitution and a democratic
republican government.23 Additionally, there was the inherent
contradiction in how a law that allowed prosecutions for seditious
libel could be in effect when the speech and press of the eighteenth
century overflowed with criticisms of government. More to the
point, as Professor Harold Nelson noted, "[c]ourt trials for sedi-
tious libel ended as a serious threat to printers in the American
colonies with the Zenger case [in 1735].1"24
Countering such criticism, Levy argued that Smith underval-
ued the significance of "scores of persons, probably hundreds"2 5
who were brought before legislatures, "that acclaimed bastion of
the people's liberties,"26 and were found in contempt or breach of
legislative privilege for expression that made the legislators un-
happy. Perhaps most telling of all was Levy's point that "the Sedi-
tion Act, passed less than seven years after the ratification of the
First Amendment, suggests that the generation that framed the
amendment did not consider the suppression of seditious libel to
22. SMITH, supra note 15, at 11. Smith read 8,000 eighteenth century newspa-
pers in preparing his rebuttal of Levy. Id. at viii. For a summary of the broad
constructionists, see LEw, supra note 15, at xiii-xiv & n.l1.
23. SMITH, supra note 15, at 6, 72-73, 162-63 (quotingJames Madison); see also
GEORGE HAY (pseud. HORTENTIUS), AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS; RE-
SPECTFULLY INSCRIBED TO THE REPUBLICAN PRINTERS THROUGHOUT THE UNITED
STATES 26-29, 48-49 (Phila. 1799) (urging that Sedition Act was "not warranted by
the Constitution of the United States"); James Madison, Amendments to the Constitu-
tion, in 12 THE PAPERS OFJAMES MADISON 196, 203 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A.
Rutland eds., 1979).
24. Harold L. Nelson, Seditious Libel in Colonial America, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
160, 164 (1959), quoted in LEVY, supra note 15, at 17 n.4. Nelson found "little to
refute this hypothesis" in doing his research, but admitted he may have missed
some unexplored court records. Nelson, supra, at 164, 170; see also SMITH, supra
note 15, at 7-8, 83 (noting how trials for seditious libel ceased to threaten printers
after Zenger trial in 1735). Levy acknowledged the point, stating: "But prosecu-
tions were infrequent, the press habitually scurrilous .... The law threatened
repression; the press conducted itself as if the law scarcely existed." LEvY, supra
note 15, at 271. He admitted he was "puzzled by the paradox," and that he had
been wrong in the preface of Legacy of Suppression, when he wrote that "the Ameri-
can experience with freedom of political expression was as slight as the theoretical
inheritance was narrow." Id. at ix. But Levy was unpersuaded that the common
law changed just because seditious libel was common. He analogized to the pres-
ent day, noting "obscenity is still illegal, though we live in a society saturated by it
and witness few prosecutions; their paucity does not illumine the meaning of ob-
scenity." Id. at xvi.
25. LEVY, supra note 15, at 18 (quoting MARY P. CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRrVI-
LEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 117 (1943)). Levy maintained that Smith
"botch [ed]' his analysis of these cases. Id. at 83.
26. Id. at 17.
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be an abridgement of freedom of speech or press."' 7
In response to Levy's counter-attack, however, Smith could cite
James Madison, author of the First Amendment, who passionately
proclaimed the Sedition Act violated the First Amendment and who
excoriated the Congress for returning America to "ancient igno-
rance and barbarism."28 Indeed, based upon claims by narrow con-
structionists, one is left to wonder why a sedition statute was even
necessary, given that the common law of the United States already
recognized prosecutions for seditious libel and was unchanged by
the First Amendment.2 This is a corollary to the argument of the
broad constructionists who question why a First Amendment was
necessary if it merely embraced freedom from prior restraint, when
prior restraint had not been practiced in this country for almost
seventy years.30 Of course, assuming that prior restraints were so
27. Id. at 269.
28. SMrrH, supra note 15, at 71-73 (quotingJames Madison, Address of the Gen-
eral Assembly of the People of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 332-33, 339 (G.P. Putnam's Sons 1900-1910)). Smith also criticized
Levy's contention that the use of parliamentary privilege continued after the
Revolution up to the adoption of the First Amendment, by stating that Levy "is
unable to cite any instances." Id. at 9.
29. Madison blamed partisan politics for passage of the Sedition Act. SMrTH,
supra note 15, at 59, 72. Levy concurred in this determination. LEvy, supra note
15, at 298; see also id. at 280 (examining partisan division over Sedition Act and
noting that "[n]ot a single Federalist in the United States opposed the constitu-
tionality of the Sedition Act"). Levy contended, though, that the Sedition Act had
a virtue in that it inspired its opponents to develop a progressive, broad libertarian
theory of the First Amendment. Id. at 282-349. Smith also noted the outpouring
of opposition, but saw it differently, arguing that the opponents had been "pre-
pared by a century of libertarian thought to make cogent responses to the majority
party's maneuver and to reject emphatically the Blackstonian position on freedom
of expression which the Federalists used." SMITH, supra note 15, at 84.
30. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 248 (1936) (stating that
it was impossible that Framers intended "narrow view then reflected by the law of
England that [press] freedom consisted only in immunity from previous censor-
ship; for this abuse had then permanently disappeared from English practice");
David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455, 534-35
(1983) (questioning Levy's thesis and arguing that to accept it as true would re-
quire belief in proposition "that the press clause was directed at what was in
America a non-issue-prior restraint-rather than at seditious libel, which had
been the primary form of government restraint during the colonial period");
Smith, supra note 1, at 458 (1987) (stating that "[v]ery few Americans alive at the
time of the ratification would have had any firsthand experience with prior re-
straint" and "discussion of government censorship as such largely was absent from
the ratification debates"). But see W.R. Vance, Freedom of Speech and of the Press, 2
MINN. L. REv. 239, 248 (1918) (noting that prevailing view of American courts
interpreting First Amendment freedom is freedom from prior restraints).
One might also suggest that prior restraint of speech was never at issue be-
cause, as Gallatin and Cooley observed, a person cannot effectively be stopped
from speaking beforehand. See LEw, supra note 15, at 302-30 (noting Gallatin's
theory that prior restraint on speech was unthinkable and impractical because
7
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obviously forbidden, the question remains as to why the doctrine
against prior restraint reemerged as an issue 140 years after the
adoption of the First Amendment, ultimately gaining the endorse-
ment of the slimmest of Supreme Court majorities in Near v. Minne-
sota ex. rel. Olson?31
In examining this period, historians have been forced to draw
numerous inferences using a bewildering number of obscure let-
ters, newspaper columns, and speeches to buttress their points. A
neutral observer, though, might find two points beyond debate:
(1) the Framers shared no one viewpoint; and (2) while the Fram-
ers disputed the application of the First Amendment to specific situ-
ations, they agreed that it was intended as a limitation upon
government. Some would have put the barrier higher, some lower,
but the language of the amendment itself, the intent behind the
Bill of Rights and the libertarian tenor of the times demonstrate
irrefutably that "fences" were intended between speakers and
government.32
Commentary from sources as diverse as the Federalist Papers,33
Congress could not "seal mouths or cut out tongues of the citizens of the
Union"-so First Amendment must have banned subsequent punishment);
Kalven, supra note 3, at 32 n.147 ("[T]he mere exemption from previous restraints
cannot be all that is secured by the constitutional provisions, inasmuch as of words
to be uttered orally there can be no previous censorship .... ") (quoting 2 J.
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 855-56 (8th ed. 1927)); cf Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) (stating that "[ilt is always
difficult to know in advance what an individual will say"); Martin H. Redish, The
Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53,
91 (1984) (noting that "a court or prosecutor could not know of the planned solic-
itation before it is spoken").
31. 283 U.S. 697 (1931); see also Gillmor, supra note 3, at 3 (summarizing pa-
per presented by Garry Wills at Near v. Minnesota 50th Anniversary Symposium,
May 1981). Even though the United States Supreme Court did not address the
issue until 1931, the prior restraint doctrine did not lay dormant in state courts,
which endorsed the doctrine against prior restraint, although not always enthusias-
tically. See Margaret A. Blanchard, Filling in the Void: Speech and Press in State Courts
prior to Gitlow, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED-NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS 14, 25-26 (Bill Chamberlin &
Charlene Brown eds., 1982) (outlining state courts' adoption of prior restraint and
stating that it "did not always please state court judges").
32. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 72-73 (1963) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (stating that "the Bill of Rights was designed to fence in the Govern-
ment and make its intrusion on liberty difficult").
33. See The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison), in II THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTI-
TUTION 163, 164 (B. Bailyn ed., 1993) ("If angels were to govern men, neither
external nor internal controuls [sic] on government would be necessary .... A
dependence on the people is no doubt the primary controul [sic] on the govern-
ment; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.").
824
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"Brutus,"3 4 "Agrippa,"3 5 the "Federal Farmer"36 and the "Plough
Jogger,"37 as well as more recent authority,3 8 illustrate vividly that
the central concern of the debate over the new Constitution was the
limitation of governmental power.3 9 In response to this concern, a
34. See "Brutus I," in I id. at 164, 174 ("In so extensive a republic, the great
officers of government would soon become above the controul [sic] of the people,
and abuse their power to the purpose of aggrandizing themselves, and oppressing
them."); "Brutus IX," in II id. at 40 (stating that government ought not have any
control over certain rights and should be restricted as much as possible in exercise
of powers operating to injury of community, which principles are not only com-
mon sense but great principles of late revolution); "Brutus XI," in II id. at 129, 134
(warning that men in office are "tenacious of power" and will "extend their
power," so courts can be expected to "enlarge the sphere of their own authority").
35. See "Agrippa XVIII" (James Winthrop), in II id. at 155, 157 ("The experi-
ence of all mankind has proved the prevalence of a disposition to use power wan-
tonly. It is therefore as necessary to defend an individual against the majority in a
republick [sic], as against the king in a monarchy.").
36. See "Letters from the 'Federal Farmer' to 'The Republican,'" in I id. at
245, 277 (letter IV) (stating general presumption that "men who govern, will, in
doubtful cases, construe laws and constitutions most favourably [sic] for encreas-
ing [sic] their own powers").
37. See "Plough Jogger," in II id. at 414, 414-15 (recognizing need for more
efficient government than prescribed by Articles of Confederation, consistent with
liberties of people, but stating every possible check should be put on those having
supreme power in our politics).
38. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 55-77 (1967) (discussing how "disposition of power" was central controversy
of revolution); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 23, 241 (1988) (ex-
amining principles founding American Republicanism and stating that idealogy of
Founding Fathers "posited an eternal struggle between liberty and power"); Vin-
cent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theoty, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
521, 529-38 ("The tendency of officials to abuse their public trust is a theme that
has permeated political thought from classical times to the present.").
39. Proponents of the new Constitution acknowledged that the document ac-
corded power to the various branches, but contended that it.granted no more
power than was necessary and contained sufficient checks. See James Iredell Urges
Ratification, and a Vote is Taken, in II THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTrrUTION 910, 913
(B. Bailyn ed. 1993) (stating that to create power is to create potential for its abuse,
but this Constitution represents medium between tyranny and anarchy, two ex-
tremes equally dangerous to liberty); "A Landholder" (Oliver Ellsworth III), in Iid.
at 329, 330 (stating that "[a] government capable of controlling the whole and
bringing its force to a point is one of the prerequisites for national liberty."); The
Federalist No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton), in id. at 570, 573-74 ("The powers are not
too extensive for the OBJECTS of foederal [sic] administration, or in other words,
for the management of our NATIONAL INTERESTS; nor can any satisfactory ar-
gument be framed to shew [sic] that they are chargeable with such an excess.");
The Federalist No. 46 (James Madison), in II id. at 109, 115-16 (stating that "the
powers proposed to be lodged in the Foederal [sic] Government are as little formi-
dable to those reserved to the individual states, as they are indespensably necessary
to accomplish the purposes of the Union"); To Be or Not To Be? Is the Question, in II
id. at 406 ("To have energy, we must give power; to preserve liberty, that power must have
sufficient checks." (emphasis in original)); George Washington to the Marquis de
Lafayette, in II id. at 178, 179 (stating "the general Government is not invested with
more Powers than are indispensably necessary to perform the functions of a good
Government"); The Weaknesses of Brutus Exposed: "A Citizen of Philadelphia" (Pelatiah
1994]
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Bill of Rights was promised. While urging approval of the Bill of
Rights in his pivotal speech to the First Congress, James Madison
proclaimed that "the great object in view is to limit and qualify the
powers of government."40 He referred several times to the poten-
tial for abuse of governmental power and necessity of barriers,41
concluding: "I think we should obtain the confidence of our fellow
citizens, in proportion as we fortify the rights of the people against
the encroachments of the government."42
Rather than attempt to pinpoint which doctrine or rule of
common law that a group, or even an individual, embraced in the
late eighteenth century, it might be more useful to begin with this
common constitutional philosophy of limiting government and use
that to inform current thinking on the appropriate scope of the
prior restraint doctrine.43 As Thomas Jefferson urged, we should
"recollect the spirit manifested in the debates" when interpreting
the constitutional text.44 Those who construe First Amendment lib-
erty must be true to that spirit. It would be grossly anomalous to
preserve a common law doctrine as it was understood in 1791 when
Webster), in Iid. at 176, 187 (stating that "government may be safe and practica-
ble, where the controuling [sic] authority... is strong enough to effect the ends of
its appointment, and at the same time, [is] sufficiently checked to keep it within due
bounds, and limit it to the objects of its duty").
40. James Madison, Amendments to the Constitution, in 12 THE PAPERS OFJAMES
MADISON, supra note 23, at 196, 204.
41. See id. at 199 (stating that all power is subject to abuse, so abuse of power
by government is to be guarded against); id. at 203 (stating that many have
thought it necessary to raise barriers against all government power, and bills of
rights in federal and all state constitutions will have such salutary tendency); id. at
204 (arguing that legislative branch is more powerful and likely to abuse power
than executive in our government, so declaration of rights must be levelled at leg-
islative branch); id. at 205 (recognizing that discretionary powers, such as evi-
denced by necessary and proper clause, may admit of abuse, so argument is not
conclusive that infringement of people's rights is impossible because government
may exercise only enumerated powers); id. at 206-07 (arguing that independent
tribunals ofjustice will be motivated by declaration of rights to consider themselves
guardians of those rights and impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of
legislative or executive power); id. at 208 (advocating that equal right of con-
science, freedom of press and trial by jury in criminal cases should be protected
against state interference by including them in article one, section ten because
"every government should be disarmed of powers which trench upon those partic-
ular rights").
42. Id. at 209.
43. The futility of attempting to determine the Framers' intent as a whole
might be illustrated by the fact that the individuals changed their minds about the
meaning of free speech and press. See LEvy, supra note 15, at 320-25 (explaining
how Madison's views changed "dramatically"). If one cannot even generalize
about an individual, how can one generalize about a group?
44. SMrrH, supra note 15, at 4; see also LEVY, supra note 15, at 348 ("The princi-
ples and not their Framers' understanding and application of them are meant to
endure.").
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the spirit in which it was endorsed would dictate its expansion or
rejection under changed circumstances. To do so would exalt
processes over substance.
The doctrine against prior restraint was emblematic of the
Framers' philosophy of limited government.45 Opposition to subse-
quent punishment for seditious libel was consistent with that philos-
ophy as well, although some framers saw that more clearly than
others. All agreed, however, that prior restraint was antithetical to
freedom as they conceived it in the eighteenth century.46 During
the seventeenth century, when the press was entirely without liberty
and prior restraint was the norm, achieving freedom from licensing
was a huge step-a radical reform. The doctrine against prior re-
straint to this day, therefore, carries a certain cachet, a reminder of
the baseline of freedom. Its symbolic value should not be
underestimated.
III. PREMISES OF PRIOR RESTRAINT
Professor Vincent Blasi identifies three premises of prior re-
straint that are inconsistent with a constitutional scheme of limited
government: (1) prior restraint implies trust in the state rather
than in the individual and public; (2) speech is too risky in a de-
mocracy; and (3) individuals have no autonomy from the state.47
Attributing his insight to John Milton whose Areapagitica stands
as the classic attack on prior restraint, Blasi writes that a system of
45. See LEw, supra note 15, at 272-73 (theorizing that freedom of press and
exemption from prior restraints were essential to American governmental scheme
of checks and balances).
46. See LEvy, supra note 15, at xi (stating that "[i]n any case, freedom of the
press merely began with its immunity from previous restraints"); Emerson, supra
note 2, at 652 (noting that current cases and commentary maintain eighteenth
century distinction between strongly disfavored prior restraint and subsequent
punishment); see also Main Scordato, Distinction Without a Difference: A Reappraisal
of the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1989) (noting that label of
prior restraint "is tantamount to a declaration that the law is unconstitutional").
47. Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66
MINN. L. REv. 11, 69-82, 85 (1981). Similar principles apply when the issue is com-
pelled speech rather than restrained speech:
True, the task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights,
conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth
century, into concrete restraints on officials dealing with the problems of
the twentieth century, is one to disturb self-confidence. These principles
grew in soil which also produced a philosophy that the individual was the
center of society, that his liberty was attainable through mere absence of
governmental restraints, and that government should be entrusted with
few controls and only the mildest supervision over men's affairs.
West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1943) (invalidating
compelled salute and pledge of allegiance to flag by schoolchildren).
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censorship is an indignity to both writers and readers because the
inherent paternalism of the state associated with censorship implies
a general distrust of speakers and audiences. 48 The state is a "suspi-
cious, omnipresent tutor" if it must oversee and approve everything
that is disseminated. Blasi concludes that "[n]o system of political
authority premised on the consent of the governed can admit the
state to that role, whatever the behavioral consequences."49
Although prior restraint contemplates a "particularly active
and absolute form of intervention by the state," some would wel-
come that role because of their suspicions regarding the rational
capacities of the public. However, according to Blasi, while the ra-
tionality of the citizenry may be distrusted, the lesson of the First
Amendment is that the state is distrusted even more. Blasi thus
concludes that "[to trust the censor more than the audience is to
alter the relationship between the state and citizen that is central to
the philosophy of limited government."50
The second "troublesome premise" implicit in prior restraint is
that speech is no different than any other hazardous activities that
are licensed or enjoinable. 51 However, according to Blasi, licensing
is a method of enforcing social norms. Free speech, by its nature,
does not observe such norms; social conformity distorts public dis-
course. As Blasi notes, "[o] nly when the public views controversial
speakers as normal people, with a legitimate role to play in the so-
cial system, can the fragile state-individual balance be main-
tained."52 Speech, like democracy in general, is risky, but that is its
48. Blasi, supra note 47, at 70-71; see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES *152 ("To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser . . . is to
subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the
arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion, and
government.").
49. Blasi, supra note 47, at 71.
50. Id. at 73; cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 257 (1976) (Burger, CJ., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("[F]reedom is hazardous, but some restraints
are worse."); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 351 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) (stating that basis for democracy is "reason not authority").
51. Blasi, supra note 47, at 78-79; cf ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALIYr OF
CONSENT 27 (1975) (arguing that states license or regulate restaurants, pool halls,
and Turkish baths, so why not abortion clinics or doctors' offices?). See generally
LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986) (exploring extremist speech within
context of First Amendment).
52. Blasi, supra note 47, at 79; see also Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4
(1949) (explaining that function of free speech under our system is to invite dis-
pute, induce unrest, create dissatisfaction, or even stir anger).
Freedom of speech must contemplate more than protection of inoffensive
speech expressing mainstream attitudes. Recognition of this truism prompted the
Supreme Court to observe:
We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities
828 [Vol. 39: p. 817
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virtue.
The third and perhaps most obvious premise of prior restraint
is its subordination of individual autonomy. Blasi contendes that
prior restraints, such as
licensing systems and injunctions coerce or induce speak-
ers to relinquish full control over the details and timing of
their communications. These regulatory systems must be
premised, therefore, on the notion that either such con-
trol is not an essential attribute of the autonomy of speak-
ers, or that such autonomy need not be respected. Either
premise is objectionable.53
Thus, prior restraints could not be consistent with the concept of a
limited government.
Of particular interest to this essay is Blasi's use of the word "in-
duce" in the preceding excerpt. At least historically, coercion and
not inducement characterized prior restraint. In Tudor-Stuart Eng-
land, those who published without permission risked not only the
Crown's "most high displeasure and indignation," but imprison-
ment and the forfeiture of all goods, chattels and bonds;54 destruc-
tion of press and type;55 torture on the rack;56 amputation;57 and
execution.5 8 Prior restraint was enforced by vicious subsequent
punishment, leaving one to wonder about the validity of the
distinction.
Governmental inducements also pose a threat to the liberta-
rian values that Blasi articulated. 59 Particularly if the state finds co-
ercion unacceptable for legal or political reasons, it may turn to
that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccen-
tricity and abnormal attitudes. When they are so harmless to others or to
the State as those we deal with here, the price is not too great. But free-
dom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That
would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right
to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943).
53. Blasi, supra note 47, at 85.
54. FREDRICK S. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 1476-1776, at 49
(1952).
55. Id. at 73-74.
56. Id. at 100.
57. Id. at 91-92.
58. Id. at 50.
59. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376, 390 (1973) ("The special vice of a prior restraint is that communica-
tion will be suppressed, either directly or by inducing excessive caution in the
speaker, before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First
Amendment.").
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more sophisticated means of suppressing speech and depreciating
autonomy. The state may find the threat of subsequent punish-
ment an appealing alternative to the direct coercion of most prior
restraints. All laws authorizing subsequent punishments of expres-
sion can be considered tantamount to prior restraints, however, be-
cause laws penalizing behavior are intended to induce avoidance of
that behavior.60 Nearly every commentator on prior restraint feels
compelled to note the dubious distinction in actual effect. 61
60. Scordato, supra note 46, at 8-9.
61. See Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2779, 2782-83 (1993)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for relying on distinction between
prior restraints and subsequent punishments and arguing that "[t]he rights of free
speech and press in their broad and legitimate sphere cannot be defeated by the
simple expedient of punishing after in lieu of censoring before"); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940) (stating that penal statute no less effective or,
if impermissible, less pernicious than censorship by licensing system); Near v. Min-
nesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931) ("[T]he liberty of the press might be
rendered a mockery and a delusion, and the phrase itself a by-word, if, while every
man was at liberty to publish what he pleased, the public authorities might never-
theless punish him for harmless publications."); LEW, supra note 15, at 13, 316
(looking to writings of Madison and concluding that "a law inflicting penalties
would have the same effect as a law authorizing a prior restraint"); CASS R. SUN-
STEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, at xiii (1993) (calling failure
to hold as unconstitutional subsequent punishments for speech "a jarring conclu-
sion"); Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REv. 539, 551
(1977) (analyzing "prior-subsequent distinction"); Blasi, supra note 47, at 11, 25-
27, 73 (stating that question is whether licensing and injunctions induce signifi-
cantly more self-censorship); Emerson, supra note 2, at 648, 660 (noting that subse-
quent punishment "may prove a greater obstruction" than prior restraint of
speech); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 427 (1983)
(comparing injunctions to subsequent punishments); Hans A. Linde, Courts and
Censorship, 66 MINN. L. REv. 171, 185-86 (1981) (stating that subsequent punish-
ment is prior restraint for all practical purposes because "[ilts object is to prevent
publication, not to impose punishment"); Thomas R. Litwack, The Doctrine of Prior
Restraint, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 519, 521 (1977) ("The threat of criminal and
civil penalties can inhibit arguably protected expression from reaching the public
just as effectively as injunctions or licensing schemes."); William T. Mayton, Toward
a Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and
the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 245, 253, 265, 269-70, 276-
78 (1982) (arguing that "[s]ubsequent punishment is calculated to suppress, and
does indeed suppress, the publication of speech"); Scordato, supra note 46, at 8-9
(stating that all laws intend to influence behavior before its actual occurrence;
virtually all laws are therefore prior restraints); Diane F. Orentlicher, Comment,
Snepp v. United States: The CIA Secrecy Agreement and the First Amendment, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 662, 667 (1981) (arguing that traditional distinction is "somewhat
misleading" because both purpose and probable effect of subsequent punishment
is to deter communications, and also prior restraints may be disobeyed, with sanc-
tions for violation occuring after the fact as with any subsequent punishment); cf
Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1318 (1984) (recognizing that "fines may deter no
less thoroughly than the threat of prison and taxes no less effectively than fines").
But see Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amend-
ment Theory, 70 VA. L. REv. 53, 90 (1984) (arguing that there are significant distinc-
tions between subsequent punishments and prior restraints).
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The inducements that Blasi considers infringements on indi-
vidual autonomy are subtler, however, than those present in a sys-
tem that prefers subsequent punishment over prior restraint. Blasi
actually endorses subsequent punishment over a system of prior re-
straint that includes government intrusions in the formulative stage
of expression to "bargain" over the content or timing of expression.
Such licensing and injunctive systems tend to bring speakers and
regulatory agents together before the speech, opening the door to
negotiations and conditions.62 However, noting that if the speakers
are not mandated to bargain and are doing so of their own free will,
Blasi questions whether the autonomy of an individual is infringed.
Blasi states: "Speakers tempted to bite at the apple of compromise
Professor Mayton even dubbed subsequent punishment the "paradigmatic
prior restraint." Mayton, supra, at 249. Mayton theorized that not only are punish-
ments after the fact more effective than attempted restraints beforehand because
of the widespread self-censorship that is induced, but the general deterrence asso-
ciated with subsequent punishments is cheaper than the specific deterrence of in-
dividualized prior restraints; therefore, the state prefers subsequent punishment.
Id. at 266-72. Mayton cited Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad for the phrase
often quoted in homage to a system of prior restraint: "[A] free society prefers to
punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle
them and all others beforehand." Id. at 269 (quoting Southeastern Promotion,
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1965)). Mayton then responded:
Of course it would. Because only a "few" will be hardy enough to speak in
violation of a criminal statute, subsequent punishment carries with it di-
minished enforcement costs. In contrast, to "throttle them and all others
beforehand," as by injunctive relief, imposes large enforcement costs:
Such selective means of enforcement require judicial process for each
instance of suppression.
Id. at 269-70. To further support his theory, Mayton related the example of the
Progressive case, in which the government dropped its attempts at suppression by
injunction when a number of publishers gained access to the information. Id. at
272 (citing United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), appeal
dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979)). The Justice Department reportedly was
unable to maintain all of the different litigations necessary to suppress the articles.
Id. at 272 & n.170.
Publishers might actually prefer the certainty, reduced risk and normally
lesser sanctions of prior restraint. Emerson, supra note 2, at 659; see also Blasi,
supra note 47, at 26-27, 39, 48-49 (arguing that license is kind of "passport" to
pursue certain controversial enterprises); cf Mayton, supra, at 271-72 (stating that,
"as rational cost avoiders," publishers prefer preventive relief in face of subsequent
punishment system, thus "telling us something about the relative costs of the two
systems"). Justice Black, though, has wondered whether "a statutory scheme of
censorship" might be less of a deterrent to speech than the threat of contempt of
court for speech that might have a " 'reasonable tendency' to obstruct justice."
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 269 (1941) (finding reasonable tendency test
constitutionally insufficient).
62. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 71-72 (1963) (noting that
private consultations between government and publishers for advertisement pur-
poses is constitutionally permissible); cf. Kreimer, supra note 61, at 1373 (stating
that "while government must expend resources to find victims of penal sanctions,
recipient of benefits seeks out government").
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are in no position to complain on libertarian grounds about the
government's failure to protect them from their own willpower."63
He adds, however, that the individual's actions would have conse-
quences for other individuals and our constitutional premises:
Although a succession of individual speakers may freely ac-
cept the intrusion of government into the formulative
stages of the communicative process, the collective effect
of such a pattern of intervention can amount to a funda-
mental reallocation of roles in the direction of greater
authority for the state and less authority for the individ-
ual .... That is true even when the immediate actors in
the regulatory drama remain insensitive to the dimension
of role allocation, or cravenly choose to ignore it.64
In short, even when individuals are willing to sacrifice principles for
practical rewards, the state is not relieved of its constitutional re-
sponsibility to forgo speech regulation. Whether the state restrains
speech through outright coercion or through inducement to ac-
cept its conditions, the state has violated the philosophy of the First
Amendment contemplated by the Framers and the libertarian
premises of limited government.
IV. ILLUSTRATING THE PREMISES OF THE DOCTRINE AGAINST
PRIOR RESTRAINT
While the courts have applied the prior restraint doctrine in a
wide variety of cases, they have declined to apply it in an even larger
number of cases that arguably could have qualified. 65 Where the
63. Blasi, supra note 47, at 81.
64. Id. at 81-82; see also Kreimer, supra note 61, at 1387. The Keimer article
states:
The case for recognition of waivers rests on the conviction that constitu-
tional rights protect individual choice. But many constitutional rights
protect other values or protect individual choice only as a means to the
realization of other ends. For such rights, there is no paradox in assert-
ing that the choice of the individual should not decide the applicability of
the right in question.... To the extent that a right is the result of a
definition of the structure and power of government, an individual deci-
sion to waive it is irrelevant.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
65. In a number of cases arguably involving prior restraint, the Justices never
address the issue. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 n.9 (1989) (ac-
knowledging that Court did not address impermissible prior restraint argument
concerning constitutionality of statute that prohibited publishing name of victim
of sexual offense); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1979)
("The resolution of this case does not turn on whether the statutory grant of au-
thority to the juvenile judge to permit publication of the juvenile's name is, in and
of itself, a prior restraint."). There is likewise little or no mention of the prior
832 [Vol. 39: p. 817
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doctrine has applied, generally the Supreme Court labels the regu-
lation at issue a prior restraint, with perhaps a few Words about the
restraint doctrine in whole areas of speech in which elaborate systems of licensing
or other prior restraints are imposed, as in broadcast licensing, commercial speech
bans and S.E.C. regulations of speech. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v.
Tourism Co., .478 U.S. 328, 359 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advertising of ca-
sino gambling); Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 227, 234 (1985) (White, J., concurring)
(involving publication of newsletters containing investment advice).
For examples of decisions in which the dissent contended prior restraint was
at issue, but a majority disagreed, see Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766,
2779 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The admitted design and one overt pur-
pose of the forfeiture in this case are to destroy an entire speech business and all
its protected titles, thus depriving the public of access to lawful expression. This is
restraint in more than theory. It is censorship all too real."); CNN v. Noriega, 498
U.S. 976, 976 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari)
(arguing that enjoining CNN from broadcasting taped conversations of defendant
in criminal proceeding without any finding on part of Court that suppression was
necessary to protect defendant's right to fair trial was prior restraint and thus un-
constitutional); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 808-12 (1989) (Mar-
shall,J., dissenting) (contending that "city's exclusive control of sound equipment"
is prior restraint); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 526 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that remedy against CIA agent who wished to publish
book was prior restraint); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 96
(1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (reaffirming rejection of "notion that First
Amendment protection is diminished for 'exotic materials'" and stating that
Court should not be influenced by characterization of ordinance as merely zoning
ordinance or by "adult" content of material); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 394-95 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing) (stating that "I believe the First Amendment freedom of press includes the
right of a newspaper to arrange the content of its paper ... as it sees fit" and
concluding that commission's order acts as prior restraint); Kingsley Books, Inc. v.
Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 446 (1957) (Warren, CJ., dissenting) (holding that byjudg-
ing quality of literature or art, Court imposed prior restraint); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 579 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (holding that indictment
based on conspiracy to organize communist party and use speech or newspapers to
advocate overthrow of government "is a virulent form of prior censorship of
speech and press, which ... the First Amendment forbids"); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 101 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that ban on all sound trucks
goes beyond prior censorship).
Of course, in the leading prior restraint decision, Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, the majority thought the case involved prior restraint but the dissent dis-
agreed. 283 U.S. 647, 733-36 (1931) (Butler, J., dissenting). For examples of simi-
lar disagreements, see City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S.
750, 792 (1988) (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's characterization of
ordinance which allows mayor to deny newsrack permit as prior restraint); South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 565 (1975) (White, J., dissent-
ing) (disagreeing with Court's conclusion that city's refusal to rent its theater, thus
disallowing performance of rock musical, constituted impermissible restraint); A
Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 222 (1964) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting) (disagreeing with Court's holding because "lurking" in plurality opinion
was "unarticulated premise" that case involved prior restraint); Bridges v. Califor-
nia, 314 U.S. 252, 269, 290 (1941) (although dissent thought contempt of court
did not constitute "a censorship in advance but a punishment for past conduct,"
majority talked of its "censorial quality" and compared it to "deliberate statutory
scheme of censorship"); see also Mayton, supra note 61, at 263-64 (discussingJustice
Harlan's dissent in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963)).
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evils of cefisorship, but without offering a definition of prior re-
straint, much less an explanation as to why the given regulation
qualifies. Given the Court's approach, there seems to be no single,
coherent definition of prior restraint. As one commentator has
stated, the absence of a definition is "remarkable" in light of the
"historical significance of the concept."
6
Despite the Court's failure to articulate a definition, a prior
restraint might be defined as an attempt by government to stop
publication because of content in advance of publication. 67 This
definition is generally limited to licensing systems and injunctions,
thus excluding statutory restrictions, which are relegated to the
realm of subsequent punishments. However, because the Court has
66. Scordato, supra note 46, at 8 n.38 (1989). One commentator has gone so
far as to say that "[m]odern prior restraint doctrine defies definition." Smith,
supra note 1, at 470; see also Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2780
(1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("To be sure, the term prior restraint is not self-
defining.").
67. SeeJoseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952) ("New York
requires that permission to communicate ideas be obtained in advance from state
officials who judge the content of the words and pictures sought to be communi-
cated. This Court recognized many years ago that such a previous restraint is a
form of infringement upon freedom of expression to be especially condemned.")
Other courts and scholars have offered their versions. See Alexander v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2779 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("In its simple, most
blatant form, a prior restraint is a law which requires submission of speech to an
official who may grant or deny permission to utter or publish it based upon its
contents."); Blasi, supra note 47, at 11, 14-15 n.17 ("The doctrine of prior restraint
embodies a temporal preference. Acts of expression that could be sanctioned by
means of criminal punishment or a civil damage award may not be regulated 'in
advance.' "); Emerson, supra note 2, at 648 (defining prior restraint as "official
restrictions imposed upon speech or other forms of expression in advance of ac-
tual publication"); Jeffries, supra note 61, at 410 ("The doctrine imposes a special
disability on official attempts to suppress speech in advance of publication-a disa-
bility that is independent of the scope of constitutional protection against punish-
ment subsequent to publication."); Mayton, supra note 61, at 245 ("The prior
restraint doctrine precludes, except in certain limited circumstances, state-im-
posed restraints with respect to the publication of speech."); Redish, supra note 30,
at 53 ("Under the prior restraint doctrine, the government may not restrain a par-
ticular expression prior to its dissemination even though the same expression
could be constitutionally subjected to punishment after dissemination."); Scor-
dato, supra note 46, at 6-7, 30-31 (stating that no implicit definition can be gleaned
from pattern of Supreme Court cases, but proposing definition that would "in-
clude all government actions, and only those government actions, that result in the
physical interception and suppression of speech prior to its public expression").
Media attorney Floyd Abrams emphasized the presence of discretion in the defini-
tion of prior restraint, because total bans entail subsequent punishment. SeeJon
Dilts & Steve Helle, PLI Communication Law Seminar Addresses Important Changes in
Media Law During 1993, 21 MEDIA L. No-TEs 4, 5 (Winter 1994) (according to
Abrams, prior restraint exists only if censors' have discretion); see also Mayton, supra
note 61, at 253, 281 (propounding that core concern of prior restraint doctrine is
loose, discretionary censorship without judicial oversight, and that is same prob-
lem with subsequent punishment).
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explored what ProfessorJeffries calls the "latent plasticities" 68 of the
concept, the notion of prior restraint has diverged further from the
practices of the licenser to which Blackstone referred.69 Even the
broad definition in this paragraph proves insufficient as the Court
has resorted to the doctrine against prior restraint in the case of a
nongovernmental commission;70 when no attempt was made to
stop publication, but merely to classify the content;71 to erect proce-
dural safeguards that nonetheless provided for screening content;72
and in cases involving statutes that discouraged publication with
penalties that might otherwise be considered subsequent punish-
ment.78 Those cases in which the Court has condemned the regula-
tion as a prior restraint do, however, aptly illustrate the libertarian
principles that provide the intellectual foundation for the doctrine
against prior restraint, namely: (1) distrust of government; (2) ac-
ceptance of the risk inherent in speech; and (3) individual auton-
omy from government.
A. Distrust of Government
Distrust of government is a primary rationale underlying the
doctrine against prior restraint. For example, in Near v. Minnesota
ex rel. Olson,'4 which first explicitly adopted the doctrine against
68. Jeffries, supra note 61, at 413.
69. See 4 WILLiAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *152 ("To subject the press to
the restrictive power of a licenser... is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the
prejudices of one man, and make him the. . . infallible judge of all controverted
points."); see also Mayton, supra note 61, at 247-48 (reviewing licensing practices in
Blackstone era).
70. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
71. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 688 (1968) (review-
ing actions of Texas administrative board that classified films as "suitable for young
persons" or "not suitable for young persons"). The phrase "prior restraint" did not
explicitly appear in the case, but the case was characterized after the fact as such.
See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 n.8 (1975) (dis-
cussing Court's classification in Interstate Circuit as prior restraint).
72. See Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 563 (Douglas, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (providing for procedural safeguards in choosing musical acts
at outdoor theater and stating that "[t]he critical flaw in this case lies, not in the
absence of a few procedural safeguards, but rather in the very nature of the con-
tent screening in which respondents have engaged"); Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51, 61-62 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring) (providing for procedural safe-
guards relating to movie distibution and stating "[a] ny authority to obtain a tem-
porary injunction gives the State 'the paralyzing power of a censor' ").
73. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1939) (finding subsequent
punishment "results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of dis-
cusssion"); Near v. Minnesota ex reL Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 735 (1931) (Butler, J.,
dissenting) (discussing statute that provided for injunction if party printed pro-
scribed speech).
74. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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prior restraint as constitutional law in 1931, the Court referred re-
peatedly to the danger of the regulation at issue in deterring criti-
cism of government. Governmental abuse of its authority, with
regard to both official misconduct and the exercise of the discre-
tion necessary to implement the regulation, was the principal con-
cern in Near.75 The statute at issue was intended to quell seditious
libel, and in striking the statute, the Court served notice that prior
restraint doctrine had broken free from its historical moorings.76
The Near case involved a governmental ban on speech in advance of
publication based on its content, although the ban was in the form
of a nuisance statute enforced by judicial injunction. 7 Plaintiff
Near was ordered, under contempt of court, to stop publishing ma-
licious and scandalous libels adjudged to be nuisances. 78
Striking down the statute because it was the "essence of censor-
ship,"79 the majority in Nearmaintained that such statutory schemes
"must be tested by [their] operation [s] and effect[s]. " 80 Liberty of
75. See id. at 712-13 (observing that judicial determination of whether allega-
tions of official misconduct consistent with public welfare was "essence of censor-
ship"); see also Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 426 (1953) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("The nature of the particular official who has the power to grant or
deny the authority does not matter. Those who wrote the First Amendment con-
ceived of the right to free speech as wholly independent of the prior restraint of
anyone. The judiciary was not granted a privilege of restraint withheld from other
officials. For history proved that judges too were sometimes tyrants."); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) ("Moreover, the availability of a judicial
remedy for abuses in the system of licensing still leaves that system one of previous
restraint .... ).
76. Jeffries, supra note 61, at 416. ProfessorJeffries observed that the statute
in Near was only a "repackaged version of the law of seditious libel." The hostility
of the Justices to such a scheme created "pressure, so typical of this doctrine, to
cram the law into the disfavored category of prior restraint, even though it in fact
functioned very differently from a scheme of official licensing." Id.
77. Near, 283 U.S. at 701-03.
78. Id. at 703-04.
79. Id. at 713.
80. Id. at 708, 713, 723; cf id. at 712 (referring to "object and effect of the
statute"). The Court in Near went on to state that "in passing upon constitutional
questions the court has regard to substance and not to mere matters of form ...."
Id. at 708. The Court referred to the importance of substance on two other occa-
sions. Id. at 711, 713. This would seem contrary to the assertions of some com-
mentators that the doctrine of prior restraint "deals with limitations of form rather
than of substance." Emerson, supra note 2, at 648; see alsoJeffries, supra note 61, at
410-11 (quoting Professor Emerson and adding "that the doctrine must be justi-
fied by considerations dependent on form and not simply by reference to the sub-
stantive coverage").
The dissent contended that this was not a licensing system within the histori-
cal meaning of previous restraint, but a remedy for past transgressions. Near, 283
U.S. at 735 (Butler, J., dissenting); see also Emerson, supra note 2, at 654 (asserting
that statute involved in Near was ostensibly "a system for subsequent punishment by
contempt procedure," although in practice "a serious prior restraint").
[Vol. 39: p. 817
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the press, historically and as endorsed by the Constitution, "was es-
pecially cherished for the immunity it afforded from previous re-
straint of the publication of censure of public officers and charges
of official misconduct.""' Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Hughes interpreted the statute at issue as directed not just at libels
of private citizens, "but at the continued publication by newspapers
and periodicals of charges against public officers of corruption,
malfeasance in office, or serious neglect of duty."8 2 Based upon
this statutory interpretation, Chief Justice Hughes concluded that
the statute normally operated "in relation to publications dealing
prominently and chiefly with the alleged derelictions of public of-
ficers." 3 This was a somewhat remarkable proposition, given that
the Court cited no specific language in the statute at issue,8 4 or
anything in either of the Minnesota Supreme Court opinions8 5 in
the case, to support its conclusion that the statute concerned pri-
marily libels of public officers. Therefore, while the Minneapolis
mayor, a chief of police and a county attorney had been libeled by
the defendant, so also had grand jurors, two newspapers and the
'Jewish race." 86 Interestingly, however, the Court seemed to em-
phasize operation and effect again when it observed that suppres-
sion of the newspaper or periodical was attributable to "charges
[leveled by the newspaper or periodical] of official misconduct and
the fact that the newspaper or periodical [was] principally devoted
81. Near, 283 U.S. at 717. Freedom of the press consists, among other things,
of communication on the administration of government, "whereby oppressive of-
ficers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable [sic] and just modes of
conducting affairs." Id. (quoting Letter from the Continental Congress to the In-
habitants of Quebec (Oct. 26, 1774)).
82. Id. at 710.
83. Id.
84. The Minnesota statute is excerpted at the outset of the opinion. Id. at
702-03. The Court did cite the Minnesota libel statute as authority for its conclu-
sion that the statute at issue in Near was concerned with concealing the derelictions
of public officers, noting that the libel statute provided a defense for fair comment
regarding "the conduct of a person in respect to public affairs" that was not in the
nuisance statute involved in Near. Id. at 710-11 n.3. However, the absence of any
privilege for fair comment in the nuisance statute does not suggest a negative in-
ference that it was solely or even primarily for the benefit of public officers, be-
cause the fair comment privilege covers expression relating to anybody involved in
matters of public interest or concern, which can include, for example, corpora-
tions. See ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED
PROBLEMS 238-41 (2d ed. 1994) (describing individuals and entities subject to fair
comment).
85. Near, 283 U.S. at 705-06 (citing State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 228 N.W.
326 (1929), rev'd sub nom. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)
and State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 219 N.W. 770 (1928)).
86. Id. at 703-04.
19941 837
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to that purpose."87 The Court mentioned a concern for the protec-
tion of expression regarding official misconduct seventeen times in
its opinion.88 Skepticism of the government's capacity to oversee
publications that criticized the government itself was hardly amelio-
rated by allowing ajudge to determine if future issues were "consis-
tent with the public welfare."8 9 In the final analysis, if the statute in
Near operated to suppress expression critical of official misconduct,
the doctrine against prior restraint was designed to thwart its opera-
tion as well as its effect.
The Near majority's expansion of the notion of prior restraint
to encompass judicial injunctions, as well as administrative licensing
systems, initiated an academic debate that continues to this day.90
It is significant that in Near, the Court's first pronouncement on
prior restraint, the Court signaled its intention not to be bound by
classical conceptions of prior restraint. Not coincidentally, it is also
significant that the Near opinion stands as tribute to the checking
function, which the Framers held dear9' and which presupposes
governmental abuse of its authority. 92 In subsequent cases, the
87. Id. at 711.
88. See id. at 710 (twice), 711 (three times), 712 (twice), 713 (twice), 717
(twice), 718 (twice), 719, 721, 722, 723.
89. Id. at 713.
90. Compare Blasi, supra note 47, at 24 (contending that injunctions merit sta-
tus accorded to them by Court as prior restraints deserving of treatment similar to
that given licensing systems) and Emerson, supra note 2, at 654-56 (same) and
Howard Hunter, Toward a Better Understanding of the Prior Restraint Doctrine: A Reply
to Professor Mayton, 67 CoRNELL L. REv. 283, 293-95 (1982) (same) and Thomas R.
Litwack, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 519, 539, 552
(1977) (same) with Barnett, supra note 61, at 549-51 (disagreeing with conclusion
that injunctions deserve treatment similar to that given to licensing schemes char-
acterized as prior restraints) andJeffries, supra note 61, at 433 (same) and Mayton,
supra note 61, at 249-53, 275-81 (same) and Redish, supra note 30, at 90 (same).
The truly unfortunate aspect of Near, though, is not that it broadened the
scope of prior restraint, but that it diluted the concept. In dicta, the Court alluded
to the "exceptional cases" where speakers would not be immune from previous
restraint: when the nation is at war, cases involving the "requirements of decency"
or cases involving incitements to violence. Near, 283 U.S. at 716. Before the Near
decision, the doctrine against prior restraint had been understood as unqualified
and without exception. See Smith, supra note 1, at 457, 462, 470 (arguing that
"historical evidence supports the absolutists' position that the Framers intended
that the press clause prohibit not only prior restraint, but also all content-based
controls available to government").
91. See Blasi, supra note 38, at 527-28, 533 (discussing development of First
Amendment due to framers' concern that government should be "checked").
92. Id. at 529 & n.24, 541. Government's role in the formerly private sector is
extensive and growing. See Kreimer, supra note 61, at 1295-96 (discussing govern-
ment's increased participation in traditionally private areas by conditioning fund-
ing on various social goals as well as government's expanding role in private
economy).
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Court continued to emphasize its concern for governmental exer-
cise of discretion in matters relating to speech in a line of prior
restraint cases, 93 many of which were closer in kind to the licensing
system contemplated by Blackstone. 94 However, the first prior re-
straint case following Near illustrated that the Court also considered
taxation of the press and suppression of seditious libel as within the
scope of prior restraint. The constant characteristic in all of these
opinions on prior restraint issues has been a concern for govern-
ment's abuse of its authority.
In Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc.,95 the Supreme Court in-
validated as an unconstitutional prior restraint a Louisiana tax on
selected newspapers that, on its face, did not seem even to qualify as
a subsequent punishment.96 The tax was imposed, not on content,
93. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S.'Ct. 2395, 2403 (1992)
(holding that "First Amendment prohibits the vesting of [arbitrary and] ... unbri-
dled discretion in a government official"); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub-
lishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-60, 763-64, 766-72 (1988) (holding that "unfettered"
discretion by government officials is not permitted); Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975) (holding that "the danger of censorship
... is too great where officials have unbridled discretion"); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 504-05 (1952) (criticizing law where "the censor is set adrift
upon a boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious views, with
no charts but those provided by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies"); Kunz
v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294-95 (1951) (explaining that lack of standards gov-
erning official action invalidates city ordinance); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
268, 271-72 (1951) (discussing "the invalidity of... limitless discretion"); Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558, 559-60 (1948) (holding that city ordinance that places
right to be heard in "uncontrolled" discretion of police chief is unconstitutional
on its face); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 422 (1943) (stating that issuance of
permit by mayor's discretion if "proper or advisable" is "administrative censorship
in an extreme form"); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305-06 (1940) (ex-
plaining that act allowing government official to use unguided discretion "is a de-
nial of the liberty protected by the First Amendment"); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 163-64 (1939) (striking down statute allowing "police officer to determine, as
a censor, what literature may be distributed").
94. SeeJeffries, supra note 61, at 417 & n.29 (noting that line of prior restraint
cases following Near "hark[en] back to the original meaning of prior restraint as
official licensing").
95. 297 U.S. 233 (1936). Professor Emerson was particularly critical of the
Court's application of the prior restraint doctrine in the tax cases. THOMAS I.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 511 (1970). The doctrine could
only be relevant, he wrote, if it applied to any regulation that inhibited First
Amendment freedom. Id. As Emerson noted "[wihen employed in this way the
concept becomes so broad as to be worthless as a legal rule". Id.
96. See Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 240-41 (providing detailed description of tax at
issue). The tax was part of a 1934 legislative package that would introduce, among
other things, various new taxes and repeal the Louisiana poll tax and personal
property tax on cars, all the brainchild of Huey Long, former governor of the state,
ut serving at that time as United States Senator. T. HARRY WIiI.AMs, HuEY LONG
716 (1969). Long, in attempting to bring Louisiana's highway system and schools
into the twentieth century and implement his populist program (not to mention
create a base for his challenging Franklin Delano Roosevelt for the presidency),
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but on the basis of circulation. All newspapers that circulated more
than 20,000 copies weekly were required to pay a tax of two percent
on gross receipts. 97 The tax was statutory, and the penalty for fail-
ure to pay the tax was a possible fine of up to $500 as well as impris-
onment not exceeding six months.98
The Court traced the history of "taxes on knowledge" to the
English experience, taking judicial notice of the Framers' familiar-
ity with that legacy.99 Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice
Sutherland observed that stamp taxes and taxes on advertising his-
torically had not been intended to gain revenue but to control the
flow of information regarding government. 100 These taxes shared
that characteristic 'with prior restraint, but of course, the same
might have been said of seditious libel laws, which constituted sub-
sequent punishments and which operated concurrently with the
English system of taxes on the press. Justice Sutherland concluded
his survey of English repression of the press with a quote from
Thomas Erskine: "The liberty of opinion keeps governments them-
selves in due subjection to their duties."10 1 The quote, although it
is not clear from Sutherland's opinion, dates to 1792, the year after
the First Amendment was enacted, and was made in defense of free-
exercised political power that was marked in its audacity, scope and complete con-
trol. Id. at 305-09. This did not endear him to the Old Regulars, who comprised
the establishment business interests, including the conservative newspapers of the
state, which controlled politics before Long came along. Id. at 190-91. When the
1934 package of bills languished in the legislature with many of them becoming
ineligible for consideration, Long returned from Washington, D.C., and personally
rammed them through in a display of raw political maneuvering that was as breath-
taking as it was ingenious. See id. at 717-21 (discussing Long's political maneuver-
ings). The state of the tax bills concerned him particularly. Id. at 717-18.
This colorful legislative history never made it into the Grosjean opinion, be-
yond vague references to the "suspicious" form of the tax and the "deliberate and
calculated" purpose of penalizing publishers and limiting information. Grosean,
297 U.S. at 250-51. Long was assassinated in the year before the opinion, so per-
haps the Justices were being charitable to the dead. But almost 50 years later, the
Court referred explicitly to allegations in the brief and argument of the publishers
as to how the tax on 13 of 124 newspapers in the state was Huey Long's revenge on
the "lying newspapers" that had "ganged up" on him. Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r, 460 U.S. 575, 579-80 (1983). The Court in Minneapolis
Star & Tribune noted the general conclusion that the tax had been motivated by
"improper censorial goals" and indicated the result in Grosjean was perhaps par-
tially attributable to the reaction of the Grosjean Court to Long's stated interest in
imposing a "tax on lying" upon those who criticized him. Id. at 580.
97. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 240.
98. Id. at 241.
99. Id. at 245-47.
100. Id. at 247.
101. Id at 247-48 (quoting 1 ERSKINE'S SPEECHES, High's edition 525).
840
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dom for seditious libel. 10 2 More importantly, it expressed the idea
that free expression had a definite role to play in controlling gov-
ernmental abuse of authority.
The Grosjean case, thus, articulates the checking function of
the press and the threat that governmental abuse of its authority
poses to that essential value of freedom of the press. Using the Brit-
ish government as its example, the Court in Grosjean assailed the
"persistent effort" to curtail any criticism, true or false.' 03 The
Court then noted that the "predominant purpose" of the First
Amendment was "to preserve an untrammeled press as a vital
source of public information."10 4 It described public opinion as
"the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment.' 0 5 There-
fore, because the key to informed public opinion is a free press
performing the vital function of the Fourth Estate, the Court deter-
mined that to allow the press "to be fettered is to fetter our-
selves."' 0 6 The Court in Grosjean ultimately concluded that the First
Amendment was meant to preclude "any form of previous restraint
upon printed publications, or their circulation, including that
which had theretofore been effected by these two well-known and
odious methods," referring to a stamp tax and a tax on advertis-
ing.'0 7 In assessing its overall importance, Grosjean might be consid-
ered just another product of a confused Court looking to slap a
"talismanic" symbol on a regulation that the Justices abhorred. 08
102. For a discussion of Erskine's defense of Thomas Paine, including the
quotation in question, see LEvy, supra note 15, at 285-86.
103. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 245.
104. Id. at 250.
105. Id. The aim of the century-long struggle in England for freedom of the
press was "to establish and preserve the right of the English people to full informa-
tion in respect of the doings or misdoings of their government." Id. at 247.
106. Id. at 250.
107. Id. at 249.
108. See A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 222 (1964)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Frankfurter in Kingsley Books and explain-
ing rationale for doctrine against prior restraints); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,
354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957) (" '[P] rior restraint' is not a self-wielding sword. Nor can
it serve as a talismanic test.").
In an earlier case, Justice Frankfurter had warned against substituting formu-
las for considered judgment, stating:
This Court sits to interpret, in appropriate judicial controversies, a Con-
stitution which in its Bill of Rights formulates the conditions of a democ-
racy. But democracy is the least static form of society. Its basis is reason
not authority. Formulas embodying vague and uncritical generalizations
offer tempting opportunities to evade the need for continuous thought.
But so long as men want freedom they resist this temptation. Such for-
mulas are most beguiling and most mischievous when contending claims
are those not of right and wrong but of two rights, each highly important
1994]
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On the other hand, however, the case might be read as abandoning
an antiquated notion of prior restraint as limited to administrative
licensing and giving more weight to "operation and effect," while
being guided by a timeless philosophy of limited government.
Professors Jeffries and Redish emphasize that the doctrine of
prior restraint presumes a dichotomy between prior restraint and
subsequent punishment, with lesser protection, if any, accorded the
latter. 10 9 The doctrine of prior restraint, they contend, actually in-
hibits development of a doctrine regarding whether some speech
ought to be fully protected from both prior restraint and subse-
quent punishment.'1 0 However, one might suggest that this might
be a legitimate basis for reconceptualizing and revitalizing the doc-
trine, because even subsequent punishment constitutes a prior re-
straint. Professors Litwack, Mayton and Smith may be closer to the
mark, observing that while the doctrine no longer fits its historical
mold, it deserves great reverence nonetheless. 1
A virtue of the prior restraint doctrine, as it has come to be
construed, is that it puts a heavy burden, indeed an insurmountable
burden if case outcomes are any indication, on government. While
various tests have been advocated in the same breath as the doc-
trine against prior restraint, the great strength of the doctrine is
that it brings historical weight to bear in asserting outright skepti-
cism of government. Prior restraints are presumed unconstitu-
tional, and it is up to government to bear the heavy burden of
attempting to overcome that presumption.112 The doctrine has a
pedigree that no test of compelling or overriding interests can
match. The lessons embodied in the doctrine against prior re-
straint should not be forgotten, but they can easily be lost through
mere balancing. The danger is not that the doctrine has outlived
to the well-being of society. Seldom is there available a pat formula that
adequately analyzes such a problem, least of all solves it.
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 350-51 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
109. Jeffries, supra note 61, at 410-12; Redish, supra note 30, at 59.
110. Jeffries, supra note 61, at 411, 430-31 n.67, 433-34; Redish, supra note 30,
at 54 & n.6 (1984).
111. See Litwack, supra note 61, at 521-22 (suggesting that historical definition
of prior restraint may be too limited but nonetheless can be expanded beyond
traditional scope); Mayton, supra note 61, at 249, 262-63, 281 (contending that
expansion of doctrine against prior restraint to include injunctions in Near was
deviation from "functional basis" of doctrine, but subsequent punishment should
be on par with licensing and likewise disfavored because it is "paradigmatic prior
restraint"); Smith, supra note 1, at 470-71 (noting that current doctrine of prior
restraint is protective in some cases, but First Amendement Framers intended ban
on a// government control of content).
112. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per
curiam) (citations omitted).
842 [Vol. 39: p. 817
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its usefulness, but that courts will avoid applying it in cases where
they tread new ground or simply succumb to the government's si-
ren song of worst case scenarios triggered by failure to proscribe
speech.
B. Acceptance of Risk
As identified by Blasi, worst case scenarios are integral to estab-
lishing risk aversion, the second premise implicit in a system of
prior restraint. 113 In imposing prior restraint, government is at-
tempting to avert the consequences of speech that has not yet been
uttered. This necessarily requires the government, including the
courts that are passing on the constitutionality of the prior re-
straint, to gaze into crystal balls. Therefore, rationalizing the need
for prior restraint lends itself to posing the worst possible conse-
quence of the speech, if it were to occur. Those urging restraint of
speakers ironically are compelled to suggest the most unrestrained
imaginings of alleged danger. 114 Professor Emerson alluded to this
when he asserted that one of the negative aspects of prior restraint
regimes "is that they contain within themselves forces which drive
irresistibly toward unintelligent, overzealous, and usually absurd ad-
ministration.""15 Put more succinctly, "[t]he function of the censor
is to censor." 16
The only antidote for the threats of worst case scenarios is a
straightforward acknowledgement that while speech involves risks, a
commitment to freedom must predominate, including freedom for
the potent as well as the impotent. AsJustice Holmes wrote, "[t]hat
at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.... We ... wager our
salvation ...upon imperfect knowledge.""17 Justice Holmes ad-
dressed the penchant for concocting worst case scenarios head-on
113. Blasi, supra note 47, at 69-82, 85 (discussing three premises implicit in
prior restraint).
114. See Board of Trustees v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472 (D.D.C. 1991). The
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute claimed that it needed to impose a con-
tractual, all-inclusive prior restraint on the release of any findings by Stanford med-
ical researchers in order not to raise unwarranted hopes in prospective patients.
Id. at 477 & n.16. The claim received no sympathy from Judge Harold Greene who
wrote that it constituted "a strange and attenuated way of protecting health and
safety. Neither these defendants nor any other public officials have statutory or
other authority to regulate citizens' hopes." Id.
115. Emerson, supra note 2, at 658.
116. Id. at 659; see also Blasi, supra note 47, at 59 (suggesting that '[licensing]
officials can be expected to begin their chores with a predisposition to regulate
expression").
117. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting).
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when he urged citizens to be "eiernally vigilant against attempts to
check the expression of opinions that [they] loathe and believe to
be fraught with death."118 Freedom is not for the faint of heart.
Justice Holmes' caveat against caution was tested in New York
Times Co. v. United States, popularly known as the Pentagon Papers
case."19 In this case, the government asserted that if documents
classified as secret were published in the newspapers, then the al-
leged resultant danger would be "the death of soldiers, the destruc-
tion of alliances, the greatly increased difficulty of negotiation with
our enemies, the inability of our diplomats to negotiate," as well as
prolonging the Vietnam War and greatly delaying the release of
United States prisoners.' 20 Dangers do not get any worse.
One might have wondered at this characterization of the dan-
ger, however, given that the Pentagon Papers were historical docu-
ments detailing the United States involvement in the Vietnam
War. 12 ' Not only did the Papers not give away any planned troop
movements or strategic objectives, but they contained no informa-
tion not already known to the North Vietnamese. 122 Indeed, the
people most ignorant of their content was the constituency of the
government that was attempting to conceal them. The Papers, for
example, revealed that the U.S. government had deliberately en-
gaged in a manipulative public relations campaign aimed at U.S.
citizens and foreign allies, with little relation to the actual war effort
or negotiations-issues in which the North Vietnamese were, of
course, intimately aware.123 Justice Black, voting with the majority,
identified what might have been the real danger that the U.S. gov-
ernment perceived: its own embarrassment.1 24
118. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
119. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
120. Id. at 763 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
121. See id. at 722 n.3 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that documents in
question were "not under any controlled custody" nor did they relate to any "fu-
ture events"); NEIL SHEEHAN, A BRIGHT SHINING LIE-JOHN PAUL VANN AND
AMERICA IN VIETNAM 685-86, 739 (1988) (describing origin and content of Penta-
gon Papers).
122. See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 722 n.3 (Douglas,J., concurring) (explain-
ing that documents related only to history prior to 1968 and nothing about future
acts).
123. SHEEHAN, supra note 122, at 554.
124. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black
stated:
[P]aramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty topre-
vent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending
them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and
shell. In my view, far from deserving condemnation for their courageous
reporting, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and other newspa-
844 [Vol. 39: p. 817
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In the last opinion he wrote before his death, Justice Black zer-
oed in on the government's use of "national security" as its cover
for censorship in the case. 12 5 The phrase demonstrates a felicitous
choice of words by the government.12 6 An advocation of "security"
is meant to be comforting, an appeal to our natural tendency to
avoid risk. Such an appeal also casts the newspaper's attempts to
disclose the Papers in the unappealing role of exposing the country
to hazards. Justice Black, however, cautioned that the word "secur-
ity" was "a broad, vague generality." 2 7 He seemed to be suggesting
that a government, whose capacity for deception in conducting war
was revealed in the Papers, would not hesitate to deceive its citizens
by promising security. 128 According to Justice Black, free speech
does involve risks, but the Framers of the First Amendment, who
fully appreciated what it took to defend a nation, nevertheless un-
derstood that free speech provided the only real security.' 29
This paradox of security through risk is only one of many asso-
ciated with the First Amendment: a freedom to espouse no free-
dom, freedom for the speech we hate, and a right to be wrong. All,
however, share an implicit acknowledgement of the risk of free
speech. Such paradoxes perhaps explain why Professor Emerson
wrote that the theory of freedom of expression "does not come nat-
urally to the ordinary citizen, but needs to be learned." 3 0 One
does not ordinarily choose the more hazardous course, much less
associate risk with security. Prior restraint appeals to that impulse
favoring the safer path. The doctrine against prior restraint, how-
pers should be commended for serving the purpose that the Founding
Fathers saw so clearly. In revealing the workings of government that led
to the Vietnam war, the newspapers nobly did precisely that which the
Founders hoped and trusted they would do.
Id.
125. Id. at 718 (Black, J., concurring).
126. See Erwin Knoll, National Security: The Ultimate Threat to the First Amend-
ment, 66 MINN. L. REv. 161, 161-62 (1981) (stating that "government claims of na-
tional security constitute the ultimate threat to the first amendment").
127. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 719 (Black, J., concurring).
128. Id. (Black, J., concurring).
129. See id. (Black, J., concurring). Commenting on the opinions of Justices
Black and Douglas in New York Times, one commentator stated:
One thing is clear to me. It is touched on eloquently by Justices
Black and Douglas in their opinions. In a democracy the merits of war,
even while we are fighting it, must be kept in the public forum. It has
been a great American achievement of the past two decades, whatever the
vexations, that so vigorous, searching, and uncharitable a critique of our
wars has gone on while we were fighting them. This can never have hap-
pened before in the history of civilized peoples.
Kalven, supra note 3, at 35.
130. EMERSON, supra note 95, at 12.
1994] 845
29
Helle: Prior Restraint by the Backdoor: Conditional Rights
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
VILLANoVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39: p. 817
ever, teaches not only that the government's worst case scenarios
seem not to come true when information is ultimately published,131
but that attempts to achieve security through suppression pose the
greater risk.1 32 The risk is not in speech being published, but in it
not being published. That, as Justice Holmes said, "at any rate is the
theory of our Constitution."1 33
C. Regard for Individual Autonomy
The final premise of prior restraint that is also at odds with a
constitutional system of limited government is a depreciation of in-
dividual autonomy. The Court in Schneider v. State,134 for example,
took note several times of the police power to promote the public
131. See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), appeal
dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). In this case the government characterized
the danger as "thermonuclear proliferation" if The Progressive magazine were to
publish its article on "The H-bomb Secret." Id. at 995. But the argument of the
defendants and, indeed, the point of the article was that the information was not
secret and that constrained access to plutonium, trained scientists, and considera-
ble financial wherewithal were what kept countries from building their own nu-
clear weaponry, if they were deterred at all. Id. at 993-94. Howard Morland,
author of the article at issue, contended that secrecy only furthered the policies of
the U.S. government because it left key decisions on exporting plutonium, for ex-
ample, to "experts" without the bother of interference from the public. See How-
ard Morland, The H-Bomb Secret-How We Got It, Why We're Telling It, THE
PROGRESSWE, Nov. 1979, at 14. The government declined to press its case for a
permanent injunction when a number of newspapers demonstrated that the same
information at issue in the Progressive case could be obtained from public sources.
See DONALD M. GiLLMOR ET AL., MASS COMMUNICATION LAw: CASES AND COMMENT
112 (5th ed. 1990) (explaining government's decision to discontinue fight for in-
junction). Thus, there was no more danger of thermonuclear proliferation after
publication by The Progressive than there was before.
132. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 351
(1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that when the "govern-
ment seeks to manipulate private behavior by depriving citizens" of information, it
,strikes at the heart of the First Amendment. This is because it is a covert
attempt by the State to manipulate the choices of its citizens, not by per-
suasion or direct regulation, but by depriving the public of the informa-
tion needed to make a free choice .... [T] he State's policy choices are
insulated from the visibility and scrutiny that direct regulation would en-
tail and the conduct of citizens is molded by the information that govern-
ment chooses to give them.'
Id. (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,
447 U.S. 557, 574-75 (1980) (Blackmun,J., concurring)); see also Knoll, supra note
126, at 168 ("Prior restraint is, perhaps, the most obnoxious form of governmental
abuse because it puts the government's own conduct beyond public scrutiny....
The government needs to offer no public justification for imposing secrecy; the
justification itself is secret.").
133. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting).
134. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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interest in regulating the public streets.1 35 However, when munici-
pal ordinances sought to license the dissemination of leaflets on
those thoroughfares, the Court found that the ordinances infringed
not only on individual speech, but on a system of government:
This court has characterized the freedom of speech and
that of the press as fundamental personal rights and liber-
ties. The phrase is not an empty one and was not lightly
used. It reflects the belief of the framers of the Constitu-
tion that exercise of the rights lies at the foundation of
free government by free men. It stresses, as do many opin-
ions of this court, the importance of preventing the re-
striction of enjoyment of these liberties.
... Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting
matters of public convenience may well support regulation
directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to
justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to
the maintenance of democratic institutions.136
If speaking in a public forum imposes burdens or inefficiencies
on the state, such is the price of maintaining individual auton-
omy.1 37 The ordinance addressed in Schneider was particularly odi-
ous to the Court in that it allowed a police officer, acting "as a
censor," to determine what literature could be distributed and who
would distribute it, and required pamphleteers to submit to ques-
tioning, photographing and fingerprinting. 38 Such censorship
struck at the heart of free expression because it placed discretion in
the officer rather than the speaker.13 9 Moreover, the Court made
clear that individual autonomy extended not only to the message
but to the site of the speech: "[O]ne is not to have the exercise of
his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea
that it may be exercised in some other place."' 40
135. Id. at 160, 163, 165.
136. Id. at 161 (footnote omitted).
137. See id. at 162 (discussing resultant littering as "indirect consequence" of
disseminating pamphlets that can be addressed by prosecution of anti-littering laws
without abridging speech).
138. Id. at 163-64.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 163. Contrast this deference regarding location with the test for
regulation of time, place or manner of expression, which asks if ample alternative
forums are available as well as requiring content neutrality and narrow tailoring
(but not consideration of less restrictive alternatives) to further a significant gov-
ernmental interest. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). The
considerably less discretion afforded speakers subject to a time, place or manner
regulation can be problematic if the threat to content is not overt on the face of
19941
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The Court has also indicated that individual discretion regard-
ing the timing of expression cannot be subject to prior restraint. 41
Speakers whose content is judicially enjoined may be held to the
collateral bar rule, however, which requires obedience to a judicial
ruling until overturned or face contempt of court regardless of the
ultimate validity of the ruling.142 Nonetheless, because of the trans-
parent unconstitutionality of prior restraint, speakers, unlike other
violators ofjudicial orders, likely would still be able to choose when
to speak if prompt judicial review is unavailable. 143
the regulation, but the regulation has the potential to act as a prior restraint. See
id. at 808-11 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing city's ability to censor musical
expression indirectly using regulation of sound equipment). See generally Daniel A.
Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEo. L.J.
727, 730 (1980) (describing content neutrality as "alluring mirage"); Martin H.
Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. Rv. 113, 114
(1981) (analyzing development of content distinction, theoretical bases of distinc-
tion, "conceptual difficulties inherent in its use" and possible remedies); Paul B.
Stephan III, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. Rv. 203, 206
(1982) (proposing "that a broad content neutrality rule not only obscures free
speech questions but is antithetical to any rational analysis of freedom of
expression").
Additionally, the Court's rejection of least-restrictive-alternative analysis in
cases ostensibly involving regulation of time, place or manner seems to greatly
reduce individual autonomy and the burden on the state, eliminating it in all cases
but those involving the most gratuitous regulations. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 806
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, after today's decision, a city could claim that
bans on handbill distribution or on door-to-door solicitation are the most effective
means of avoiding littering and fraud, or that a ban on loudspeakers and radios in
a public park is the most effective means of avoiding loud noise.").
141. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560 (1976); see Blasi, supra
note 47, at 82 ("When government possesses the power to delay communications
that it cannot suppress, speakers cannot be said truly to control, in the sense re-
quired for autonomy, their own communicative endeavors.").
142. Barnett, supra note 61, at 552-53. Professors Fiss and Barnett argue that
the presence of the collateral bar rule supplies the only rationale for treating in-
junctions-as well as licensing systems-as prior restraints because, in the absence
of the rule, the process of imposing sanctions for violations of injunctions seems to
have much in common with any other subsequent punishment. See OWEN M. Fiss,
THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCrION 69-74 (1978) (explaining effects of disobedience of
court-ordered injunctions when collateral bar rule applies); Barnett, supra note 61,
at 552-53, 558 (indicating that injunctions are more effective if collateral bar rule
exists and stating removal of rule would undermine effectiveness of injunctions).
Blasi, however, concludes that even in the absence of the collateral bar rule, in-
junctions share with licensing a propensity for overuse and enforcement without
careful consideration of the actual consequences of the speech, as well as the
premise that speech is abnormally risky. Blasi, supra note 47, at 89-92. Because of
their common features, as he perceived them, Blasi would maintain that both in-
junctions and licensing systems should be treated as prior restraints, even in the
absence of the collateral bar rule. Id. at 92. If the collateral bar rule remains
viable in the speech realm, its enforcement treads particularly heavily on individ-
ual autonomy. Id. at 83-84.
143. See In re Providence journal Co., 820 F.2d 1354, 1355 (1st Cir. 1987) (per
curiam) (en banc) (stating "that it is not asking much... to require a publisher,
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The concept of individual autonomy answers the fundamental
question in each prior restraint case of "who is to decide?" The
choice of what, when and where to speak is either left to the discre-
tion of the speaker or overruled by the state. Autonomous speech
is the condition precedent to the autonomous citizenship contem-
plated in the democratic model. As Robert Post described it,
"[c]ensorship cuts off its victims from participation in the enter-
prise of autonomous self-government, and the fundamental demo-
cratic project of replacing the 'unilateral respect of authority by the
mutual respect of autonomous wills' is pro tanto circumscribed."144
Post writes that the ideal of an autonomous speaker as integral
to democracy is under attack from those who criticize the allegedly
"disreputable state of contemporary democratic dialogue" and offer
a collectivist model as the alternative.14 5 The critics contend that
autonomy is not an end in itself, and if it produces anemic public
discourse, then it should be abandoned in favor of promoting the
public interest and effective collective self-determination.1 46 Post
observes, however, that these critics are attacking not only laissez-
faire speech, but a system of government founded on self-determin-
ism. 147 First Amendment doctrine, with its "focus on autonomy,"
may be "quaint," but it is one of the last areas of constitutional law
to uphold the democratic tradition as it has traditionally been un-
derstood.1 48 If autonomy in speech is rejected, Post concludes, the
even when it thinks it is the subject of a transparently unconstitutional order of
prior restraint, to make a good faith effort to seek emergency relief from the ap-
pellate court"), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 693 (1988).
144. Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of
Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1109, 1116 (1993) (quotingJEAN PiAGET, THE
MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 366 (Marjorie Gabain trans., 1948)).
145. Id. at 1109; see also Steven Helle, The News-Gathering/Publication Dichotomy
and Government Expression, 1982 DuKE L.J. 1, 20-27 [hereinafter Helle, The News-
Gathering/Publication Dichotomy] (explaining role of government in social responsi-
bility theory of freedom of press as limited to intervention only in instances where
public benefits as a result); Steven Helle, Whither the Public's Right (Not) to Know?
Milton, Malls, and Multicultural Speech, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 1077, 1080-85, 1093-95
[hereinafter Helle, Whither the Public's Right (Not) to Knowrv (discussing develop-
ment and advocates of liberal and collectivist theory).
146. See COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PREss, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE
PREss 17-19 (1947) (explaining need for freedom of press but emphasizing that
with freedom comes accountability); Jerome Barron, Access to the Press-A New First
Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1641 (1967) (stating that free expression is "a
romantic conception" and that "only by responding to the present reality of mass
media's repression of ideas can the constitutional guarantee of free speech best
serve its original purpose"); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA
L. REv. 1405 (1986) (expressing concerns regarding "the Tradition" of free
speech).
147. Post, supra note 144, at 1136-37.
148. Id. at 1137.
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implications go to the core of our belief in self-government, and
"beguiling visions of progressive reform" should not obscure that
democratic legitimacy, and not just autonomous speech, are at
issue. 149
Government, however, is charged with furthering the collective
interest of the public, and may not act contrary to that interest.150
Government also engages in speech.151 As may any speaker, gov-
ernment may choose not to speak.1 52 Government commonly
chooses not to reveal its records, open its meetings or provide its
constituents with a full account of all it knows.1 55 In this sense, gov-
ernmental inducements to non-governmental speakers to refrain
from speaking carry a double implication.
First, such governmental inducements raise a question as to
the propriety of silence; because government is obligated to ad-
vance the public's right to know, induced silence presumptively dis-
serves that objective.1 54 Second, however, when government
chooses not to speak and coerces or induces non-governmental
speakers to abide by that policy choice, such state action constitutes
prior restraint of the speakers. Just as compelling a non-govern-
mental speaker to express a message approved by government can
be considered government speech, so too may governmentally im-
posed silence be considered a form of government communication.
149. Id.
150. See The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison), in II THE DEBATE ON THE CON-
STrruTION 47, 48 (B. Bailyn ed. 1993) ("[W]here power is to be conferred [upon
political institutions], the point first to be decided is whether such a power be
necessary to the public good; as the next will be, in case of an affirmative decision,
to guard as effectually as possible against a perversion of the power to the public
detriment,").
151. See MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 5 (1983) ("Governments
not only act, but communicate-through ... speeches."); Helle, The News-Gather-
ing/Publication Dichotomy, supra note 145, at 51 ("Government, too, has a right of
speech."); see also First Amendment Implications of the Rust v. Sullivan Decision: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciay, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. 23 (1991) (statement of Floyd Abrams) (asserting that Congress has rights
under First Amendment and should speak out if it disagrees with Supreme Court)
[hereinafter Hearing].
152. YUDOF, supra note 151, at 9-10. Silence may speak volumes, as illustrated
by one commentator's observation that "government secrecy may itself be thought
of as a powerful communications device." Id. at 10.
153. Id.
154. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (involving
right to "open public trial"); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508-
10 (1984) (same); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604-05
(1982) (stating that First Amendment ensures that discussion of governmental af-
fairs is informed); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573-76 &
n.9 (1980) (plurality opinion) (emphasizing right to open public trial guaranteed
by First Amendment).
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In either case, the focus should be solely on government. The
theme of limited government permeating our constitutional polity
requires no less. If the government scheme is found to be inconsis-
tent with the premises of the doctrine against prior restraint-skep-
ticism toward government, acceptance of the risk inherent in
speech, and regard for individual autonomy that give expression to
the prerequisite of limited government-the scheme must fail. No
balancing, no three-part tests, no artful doctrinal constructs can
save it. To hold otherwise is to contradict the one thing that is clear
about our Constitution generally and the First Amendment specifi-
cally: it is aimed at limiting government, not individual speakers.
V. PRIOR RESTRAINT IN Rust
The theory that government can control governmentally
funded speech is, therefore, of major concern. The battles about
the constitutionality of classic prior restraints, involving straightfor-
ward coercion, have been fought and won; yet government now
seems to see the advantage in using its immense wealth to achieve
what it cannot do outright. The analysis, however, should be no
different if government exercises raw power by censoring speech
through injunction or by offering funds whereby a speaker be-
comes an agent of government's silence.
Professor Reich noted in 1964 the potential for government's
power becoming complete if doctrine did not keep up with this new
threat to rights. 155 He warned of the government's power "to
'purchase' the abandonment of constitutional rights."15 6 Such
abuses not only have already occurred, but courts have approved
the government's action in a number of instances where govern-
ment funding is conditioned upon meeting certain require-
ments. 157 Twenty years later, Professor Kreimer surveyed the
landscape of conditioned rights and remarked that "increasingly
155. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733, 764 (1964).
156. Id.; see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 327-28 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (objecting to government buying up constitutional rights).
157. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-10 (1987) (conditioning of
federal highway funds on states' agreement to raise drinking age held constitu-
tional despite Tenth Amendment challenge based on states' rights); Snepp v.
United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (involving government employment
conditioned on agreement to pre-publication review); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
99 (1976) (per curiam) (conditioning politicians' speech in exchange for cam-
paign financing); Jim Carlton, The Trade-Off: Project Residents Gain Freedom from
Crime, But Pay Price in Rights, WA.L ST. J., Apr. 26, 1994, at Al (describing how
residents in HUD-controlled Los Angeles housing projects exchange constitutional
freedom from search and seizure for security against crime); cf. Selective Serv. Sys.
v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984) (upholding stat-
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visible governmental actions substantially impinge on individual
lives without invoking the threat of mayhem or incarceration. The
greatest force of a modern government lies in its power to regulate
access to scarce resources." 158
Thus, a case such as Rust v. Sullivan 59 presents a troubling pre-
cedent for the doctrine against prior restraint. Rust involved the
constitutionality of regulations prohibiting Title X-funded family-
planning clinics from any counseling or referral regarding abor-
tions. 160 Although a clinic could provide abortion counseling in a
ute requiring college students to register for draft, if eligible, as condition of re-
ceiving federal financial aid).
158. Kreimer, supra note 61, at 1295-96; see also Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of
Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REv.
1185 (1990) (discussing problem of conditions placed on public assistance bene-
fits); Kreimer, supra note 61, at 1396 (explaining that allocative sanctions by gov-
ernment should not escape "constitutional scrutiny"); William W. Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439,
1461-62 (1968) (stressing expanding role of government into traditionally private
areas); Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowledge, 61 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 587, 605 (1993) ("[T]he welfare state wields as much power by with-
holding benefits as by coercive force. In a society where survival depends on inclu-
sion in an economy dominated by government welfare of one sort or another, the
consequences of exclusion may be more devastating than criminal punishment.");
Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L.
REv. 1103, 1103-04 (1987) (asserting that conditional government spending has
played large role in manipulating individuals' and businesses' behavior).
The conditioning of rights by the government increasingly has become a
problem for constitutional scholars. As one commentator noted:
Many of the most vexing questions in constitutional law result from
the rise of the modern regulatory state, which has allowed government to
affect constitutional rights, not through criminal sanctions, but instead
through spending, licensing, and employment. It may well be in these
areas that constitutional doctrine is least well developed. It is here that
constitutional law promises to receive its most serious tests in the next
generation.
Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (With
Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 593 (1990).
But see id. at 608 (stating that "current doctrine contains a core and unavoidable
insight: Funding, regulating, and licensing decisions are indeed sometimes differ-
ent from criminal punishment").
159. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
160. Id. at 178-81. The regulations subsequently were codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 59.8-.10 (1993). During the first eighteen years of the Title X program, family
planning clinics were under no restrictions regarding counseling of patients. Rust,
500 U.S. at 178-79. In 1988, however, the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices implemented the "Gag Rule," prohibiting any counseling regarding abortion.
Id. at 179-80 (referring to 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1)-(a)(3) (1993)). President Wil-
liamJ. Clinton, in one of his first acts after assuming office, directed that the "Gag
Rule" be suspended. President's Memorandum ofJan. 22, 1993, The Title X "Gag
Rule," 58 Fed. Reg. 7455 (1993). The Department subsequently issued revised reg-
ulations suspending the rule. Standards of Compliance for Abortion-Related Serv-
ices in Family Planning Service Projects, 58 Fed. Reg. 7462 (1993) (to be codified
in 42 C.F.R. § 59) (interim rule).
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segregated program subsidized with non-Tide X funds, the most a
doctor in a Title X-funded program could do was advise a patient
that "advice regarding abortion is simply beyond the scope of the
program." 161 Those employed with Tide X funds could discuss
abortion when not working at the clinic, but when employed on a
Tide X project, the Court held that the employees voluntarily ac-
cepted the conditions attached to the funds.162
A. Facilitating Speech, But Not Freedom of Speech
A remarkable number of conclusory statements permeate the
majority opinion. 163 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that there was
"no question"16 as to the constitutionality of the statutory provi-
sion, apparently overlooking that the four dissentingJustices 65 and
two lower courts 66 had all raised just such a question regarding the
construction of the statute at issue. The ChiefJustice further main-
161. Rust, 500 U.S. at 200.
162. Id. at 198-99.
163. The reasoning of the majority opinion in Rust has found little favor
among commentators. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 61, at 117-18 (asserting that
whether laws relate to funding decisions or pre-existing property, they must be
assessed in terms of their operation and effect on speech, and proposition that
government may allocate funds in any way it chooses is anachronistic idea regard-
ing relationship between citizen and state); David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Con-
ditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv.
675, 693 (1992) (describing Court's analysis in Rust as "hopelessly inconsistent");
Roberts, supra note 158, at 615 (claiming "Court's reliance on neutral principles
... masked the regulations' violence" to poor women and "overlooked broader
issues of social power"); Michael Fitzpatrick, Note, Rust Corrodes: The First Amend-
ment Implications of Rust v. Sullivan, 45 STAN. L. REv. 185, 213 (1992) (calling Rust
opinion complicated and ambiguous). But cf. Theodore C. Hirt, Why the Govern-
ment Is Not Required to Subsidize Abortion Counseling and Referral, 101 HARv. L. REv.
1895, 1904 (1988) (in article written before Rust was decided, Department of Jus-
tice attorney Hirt contended that "withholding governmental support for abor-
tions through restrictions on abortion counseling and referral does not, however,
violate the first amendment").
164. Rust, 500 U.S. at 192.
165. See id. at 206 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined in this part of his opin-
ion by Marshall, J., and O'Connor, J.) (asserting that majority's statement regard-
ing constitutionality of statute "simply begs the question"); id. at 221-22 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (arguing that regulations in question are unconstitutional when
"read in the context of the entire statute"); id. at 223-25 (O'Connor,J, dissenting)
(explaining that "longstanding" rules of statutory construction deem statute
unconstitutional).
166. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1504 (10th Cir.
1990) (holding that Tide X regulations violate First and Fifth Amendment rights
of providers and patients); Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs.,
899 F.2d 53, 65, 75 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding Title X regulations unconstitutional
because they pose obstacle to freedom of choice and violate First Amendment
rights of public), cert. granted and jud. vacated, Sullivan v. Massachusetts, 500 U.S.
949 (1991).
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tamined that specifying tilat the counselors could discuss any form of
family planning except abortion was not a case of government "dis-
criminat[ing] on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to
fund one activity to the exclusion of the other."167 Such bold exam-
ples of "I say it's so, so it must be so" are not unknown in Supreme
Court opinions, 168 but they can leave the reader breathless at the
thought of decades of precedent sensitive to content regulation tee-
tering on the precipice.1 69
When the Court states that, in excluding abortion counseling
from the allocational subsidy, the government was "simply insisting
that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were
authorized," 170 one is reminded of Professor Chafee's example of
the testator who is not obligated to leave anything to his children,
but who divides his estate among all but one: "You cannot argue to
the child who is cut out of the will that he has merely failed to
receive a favor."1 71 The confusion in the opinion, however, is com-
pounded when, at the same time the Court claimes that this was just
a matter of selective discretionary funding, it also states that the
"government is not denying a benefit to anyone."1 72 The Court
provides no clue as to how the funding might be characterized if it
was neither entitlement nor benefit.
The government may have been under no obligation, but the
speakers were. Those who received Title X funds were required to
167. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
168. See Kreimer, supra note 61, at 1337-38 (describing similar assertions in
Perry Educational Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Nixon
v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603 (1960)).
169. See Cole, supra note 163, at 678-79 (asserting that Rust Court did not
.overrule decisions mandating strict content neutrality" when government selec-
tively supports speech, but "such decisions are inconsistent with broad reading of
Rust'); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1415,
1466 (1989) (stating that in reviewing lower court cases prior to their consolida-
tion in Rust case before Supreme Court, ban on abortion counseling would "un-
doubtedly" be "impermissible viewpoint censorship" if it had been imposed
directly); see also Hearing, supra note 151, at 18-19 (statement of Lee C. Bollinger)
(claiming that core perspective of case is at war with established jurisprudence and
may be nothing more than a "wrong turn" that is "unwise and unlikely" to survive).
But see Heaing, supra note 151, at 10 (statement of Leslie H. Southwick) (stating
that Rust is not anomaly but another in long line of decisions holding government
may fund some viewpoints and not others as long as no speakers stopped from
using other resources to speak).
170. Rust, 500 U.S. at 196.
171. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., 1 GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 306
(1947) (cited in Seth Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights
in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1367 (1984)).
172. Rust, 500 U.S. at 196.
[Vol. 39: p. 817
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advise pregnant women to seek prenatal care, irrespective of any
expressed desire to terminate the pregnancy, as well as make it
"abundantly clear" that they could not promote abortion.1 73 Any
clinic that was determined to counsel patients regarding abortions
"simply174 [was] required to conduct those activities through pro-
grams that are separate and independent from the project that re-
ceives Title X funds."175 Segregation of abortion counseling from
other family planning counseling is decidedly not simple, and no
one outside the Court pretended it was. 176 Indeed, the regulation
was deliberately framed, not to encourage separate abortion coun-
seling components of family planning clinics, but with the transpar-
ent purpose of suppressing certain individual speech and requiring
other speech in order to manipulate a private decision. 177 The crit-
173. Id. at 209 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting from Department of
Health and Human Services' description of its regulations in the Federal Register,
53 Fed. Reg. 2927 (1988)). According to the Department's interpretation of the
regulations, Title X-funded clinics could keep a phone book including yellow
pages on the premises, but could not provide them to a patient because the listing
of health care providers would include those performing abortions. See New York
v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 415 (2d Cir. 1989) (Cardamone,J., concurring) (stating
that such interpretation of regulation is "[a] small and petty contrivance, inconsis-
tent with our nation's high principles [and] ... woefully short of the tolerant spirit
that gave birth to and should continue to animate our constitutional system"). But
see id. at 406 & n.1 (although in minority at this point, Circuit Judge Winter in his
majority opinion maintained that if regulations contemplated "keeping" of phone
book on premises, they must have contemplated "providing" it upon request).
174. The frequency of the use of the word "simply" must have approached a
record in this case, with the majority and Justice Blackmun's dissent each using it
seven times. InJustice Blackmun's defense, some of those uses were references to
the majority opinion. As with the word "clearly," though, when "simply" is used by
lawyers, the assertion is never so simple nor so clear as the author would have the
reader believe.
175. Rust, 500 U.S. at 196. This proposition seems to conflict with the general
rule that "one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate
places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." Schnei-
der v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939); see also Rust, 500 U.S. at 213 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (citing Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209
(1977)) (stating that it is irrelevant that speech outside workplace remained unreg-
ulated in deciding constitutionality of compelled speech within workplace); Hear-
ing, supra note 151, at 19 (statement of Lee C. Bollinger) (stating fact that
recipients of Tide X funds could discuss abortion in other institutions is inconsis-
tent with many First Amendment decisions rejecting speech limitations).
176. Roberts, supra note 158, at 595. Professor Roberts noted that many clin-
ics would be forced to abandon abortion counseling altogether, or shut down if
that option proved too unappealing. Id. Planned Parenthood of New York esti-
mated that segregating abortion counseling would cost an additional $1 million.
Id. at n.36.
177. See 53 Fed. Reg. 2943-44. The preamble to the regulations acknowl-
edged a "bias" favoring childbirth and opposed to abortion, as well as an intent to
send a message "that the federal government does not sanction abortion." Id.
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ical funding provided under Title X was intended to facilitate
speech, but not freedom of speech.
Petitioner Rust complained of the incursion on freedom of
speech as viewpoint discrimination 178 and an unconstitutional con-
dition on a right.'79 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine
holds that government may not restrict the exercise of a right as a
condition of receiving a benefit.18 0 The Chief Justice responded to
178. Brief for Petitioners at 14-23, Rust (No. 89-1391).
179. Id. at 24-30; Reply Brief at 1, 12-15, Rust (No. 89-1391).
180. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317 (1994) (holding that
government may not require person to give up constitutional right in exchange for
discretionary benefit conferred by government where property sought has little or
no relation to benefit); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399-401
(1984) (holding that government cannot prohibit radio editorializing as condition
of receiving federal funds); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 n.13 (1976) (finding
employment conditioned on political partisanship violates First Amendment);
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (stating that government may not
deny benefit to person on basis that infringes upon freedom of speech); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1958) (reasoning that it would be unconstitutional
to deny tax benefit for engaging in certain forms of speech unless speech itself is
criminal). Justice Sutherland gave the doctrine its classical articulation:
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legisla-
tion which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of
rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by
which the same result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a
right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state threatens other-
wise to withhold. It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as
a general rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may
grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of
the state in that respect is not unlimited; and one of the limitations is that
it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of consti-
tutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of one constitu-
tional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a
surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the
Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of
existence.
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926).
For valuable insight into the doctrine, see Baker, supra note 158, at 1193-97
(discussing unconstitutional conditions doctrine generally); Richard A. Epstein,
The Supreme Court 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and
the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 5 (1988) (providing detailed analysis of
unconstitutional conditions doctrine); Edward J. Fuhr, The Doctrine of Unconstitu-
tional Conditions and the First Amendment, 39 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 97, 99-117 (1988-
89) (discussing different aspects of unconstitutional conditions doctrine);
Kreimer, supra note 61, at 1293 (providing framework for analyzing unconstitu-
tional conditions questions); Rosenthal, supra note 158, at 1120-23, 1142-60 (dis-
cussing unconstitutional conditions doctrine and various government spending
programs under which issue arises); Rodney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L.
REv. 69 (1982) (discussing in general terms right-privilege distinction in relation
to unconstitutional conditions); Sullivan, supra note 169, at 1415 (providing criti-
cal analysis of unconstitutional conditions issue); Sunstein, supra note 158, at 593
(providing detailed analysis of issues involved in unconstitutional conditions
doctrine).
[Vol. 39: p. 817
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both arguments with a defense of the government's selective exer-
cise of its spending power; asserting his preferred arguments, 81
Rehnquist characterized the regulation as a nonsubsidy rather than
a penaltyl82 and contended the greater power includes the
lesser.18 3 The nonsubsidy/penalty distinction is merely a matter of
The doctrine, as the preceding partial listing of sources attests, has received
considerable scrutiny lately, much of it critical, with one commentator even con-
tending that "all constitutional cases are really unconstitutional conditions cases."
SUNSTEIN, supra note 61, at 117-18 (1993). Whatever the status or validity of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, this Article takes as its touchstone the prior
restraint doctrine. Conditions that do not amount to prior restraints are beyond
the purview of this piece.
Generally, though, the subsidization of rights with attached conditions is little
different than the taxing of rights, in the sense that the government is using eco-
nomic means to accomplish political purposes. In the First Amendment realm,
both would involve efforts to regulate speech by regulating access to financial re-
sources upon which that speech was dependent. In cases of differential taxation,
such regulation is subject to strict scrutiny, even where the intent to control speech
is not obvious. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r, 460 U.S.
575, 585-86, 592 (1983) (applying strict scrutiny test to use tax imposed on cost of
paper and ink). Differential taxation is constitutionally suspect under the First
Amendment if it singles out the press, targets a small group of speakers, or discrim-
inates on the basis of the content of taxpayer speech. See Leathers v. Medlock, 499
U.S. 439, 447 (1991) ("[D]ifferential taxation of First Amendment speakers is con-
stitutionally suspect .... ). Differential subsidy of speech contingent on govern-
ment-imposed conditions might invite similar analysis. For a partial summary of
Professor Kreimer's proposed analysis of the constitutionality of allocations affect-
ing liberties, see infra note 218.
181. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-98 (1991). Chief Justice Rehnquist
has become a most ardent advocate of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument.
See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986)
(asserting greater-includes-lesser argument); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-
54 (1974) (plurality opinion) (holding that when substantive right is inextricably
intertwined with limitations on procedure used to determine right, litigant "must
take the bitter with the sweet"); Baker, supra note 158, at 1190 n.12 (statingJustice
Rehnquist most frequently invokes greater-includes-lesser argument among sitting
justices); Kreimer, supra note 61, at 1308-10 (discussing Justice Rehnquist's use of
greater-includes-lesser argument). Chief Justice Rehnquist also might see his ma-
jority opinion in Rust as a vindication of his dissent in FCC v. League of Women Voters,
where he characterized the disputed regulation as a nonsubsidy rather than a pen-
alty. 468 U.S. 364, 403, 408 (1984).
182. The distinction was pivotal. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (arguing that gov-
ernment has not discriminated on basis of viewpoint, but "has merely chosen to
fund one activity to the exclusion of the other"); id. at 194-95 (stating Rust is not
case of singling out speech content, but "a case of the Government refusing to
fund activities, including speech"); id. at 198 ("Congress has merely refused to
fund such activities out of the public fisc .... ."); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The
Supreme Court 1991 Term: Forevord: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REv. 22, 29-30 (1992) (discussing majority's holding in Rust which treated restric-
tion of funding as nonsubsidy).
183. Rust, 500 U.S. at 195 n.4. The greater-includes-the-lesser argument was
advanced in Rust when Rehnquist wrote: "We have recognized that Congress'
power to allocate funds for public purposes includes an ancillary power to ensure
that those funds are properly applied to the prescribed use." Id. He further al-
luded to it later in the opinion when he stated that the "general rule that the
41
Helle: Prior Restraint by the Backdoor: Conditional Rights
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
858 VILLANOVA LAw REVIEW [Vol. 39: p. 817
picking the appropriate baseline to reach the desired result:
Should the Court consider the denial of funding for abortion coun-
seling from the baseline of no funding at all or from the baseline of
funding without any conditions?184 The Chief Justice chose the
Government may choose not to subsidize speech applies with full force." Id. at
200. For a discussion of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument, see infra notes
185-80 and accompanying text.
184. Adoption of the former model suggests that no funding for abortion
counseling is consistent with the government nonsubsidy or inaction regarding
family planning generally. But adoption of the latter baseline would suggest that
the government's excepting abortion counseling from funding is a penalty or form
of harmful action directed at a protected right. See Sullivan, supra note 169, at
1439 ("This penalty/nonsubsidy distinction has increasingly determined the out-
comes of unconstitutional conditions challenges."); see also id. at 1466 (discussing
effect of penalty/nonsubsidy distinction on public policy and decisions in lower
courts).
Adoption of different baselines was the only difference between the majority
and dissent in FCC v. League of Women Voters, where the Court invalidated a law that
denied federal funding to public broadcasting stations that editorialized. 468 U.S.
364 (1984). The issue essentially was whether the law should be considered from
the baseline of funding for all public broadcasting speech or the baseline of no
funding at all. The majority viewed the law as a penalty, while then-Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent opined that it should be characterized as a rational and neutral
exercise of the federal spending power (including, of course, the power not to
spend). Compare id. at 398 (stating that law "simply silences all editorial speech"
and is restriction constituting significant abridgement of speech) with id. at 403
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that law is "simply" determination that "public
funds shall not be used to subsidize 'editorializing' ") and id. at 408 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (stating statute is "rational exercise of [congressional] spending pow-
ers and strictly neutral").
As justification for concluding the Title X exemption for abortion counseling
was not a penalty, the Rust majority pointed to the option of funding abortion
counseling with segregable non-Title X funds. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 197-98 (citing
Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (holding tax-deducti-
ble contributions to charitable organizations cannot be used to support lobbying,
but lobbying affiliate supported with non-deductible contributions may be estab-
lished). That option is only relevant, however, if the baseline is no funding. More-
over, the Court never addressed whether such rigid segregation of funds and
speech was itself a burden on constitutional rights. See Sullivan, supra note 169, at
1468 (indicating courts have not examined if segregation of funding itself burdens
constitutional rights).
This confusion over baselines might lead to the conclusion that the Justices
chose baselines to suit the result they wished to reach. The distinction between
penalties and nonsubsidies seems unhelpful as "the ordering principle of unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine." Id. at 1442; see also Sunstein, supra note 158, at 602-
03 (discussing problem with penalty/nonsubsidy distinction in context of denying
Medicaid entitlements). For a further discussion of the nonsubsidy/penalty dis-
tinction, see infra note 222.
Professor Roberts saw the distinction as an attempt to reduce the issue to ab-
straction. See Roberts, supra note 158, at 600-01. She stated that this abstraction
allows the Court to distance itself "from the violence of its decision." Id. at 603. A
characterization of the regulation as governmental "inaction" upheld the distribu-
tion of wealth andprivilege under the status quo, and meant the "women's suffer-
ing results from the circumstances of poverty, for which the judges hold no
responsibility." Id. at 602-03. Professor Roberts went on to state:
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former.
The "greater includes the lesser" argument maintains that the
governmental power not to bestow a privilege at all-in Rust, fund-
ing for family planning clinics-includes the lesser power to pro-
vide it with conditions attached. 185 The deductive logic in the
greater-includes-the-lesser argument had been questioned since al-
[T]he ease with which the regulations can be characterized alternatively
as a mere failure to subsidize abortion counseling or as the affirmative
manipulation of women's choices demonstrates the futility of the action/
inaction distinction as a basis for judging the regulations. We can easily
recharacterize government omission as affirmative interference: The
state actively protects the rights of affluent women through laws that re-
quire informed consent, while deliberately promoting ignorance of medi-
cal information among poor women.
Id. at 604.
185. See Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 542 (1876) (holding that
Wisconsin could cancel license of foreign insurance company to do business in
Wisconsin if company removes any case from state court to federal court); Baker,
supra note 158, at 1190 & n.12 (discussing "greater includes the lesser" rationale
and cases employing it); Kreimer, supra note 61, at 1305-10 (discussing Supreme
Court's use of "greater includes the lesser" rationale). The greater-includes-the-
lesser argument is the "traditional antagonist" of the unconstitutional conditions
argument. Serpas v. Schmidt, 827 F.2d 23, 39 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
904 (1988). Included within the greater-includes-the-lesser argument is the right-
privilege distinction: "If a certain benefit is found to be a privilege, and not a
right, then it may be denied entirely at the government's discretion. This greater
power then justifies the imposition of conditions." Kreimer, supra note 61, at 1308
n.43.
The most famous proponent of the greater-includes-the-lesser was Justice
Holmes. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 52-54 (1910) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) ("I confess my inability to understand how a condition can be un-
constitutional when attached to a matter over which a state has absolute arbitrary
power."); Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 114 (1895) (holding that as legisla-
ture could end public use of public place, it could prevent certain uses of public
place), affd, 167 U.S. 43 (1897); Baker, supra note 158, at 1190 n.12 (discussing,
inter alia, cases where Justice Holmes discussed doctrine); Kreimer, supra note 61,
at 1306-07 & n.34 (discussing cases where justice Holmes used doctrine); Sunstein,
supra note 158, at 597-98 (discussing "Holmesian" analysis of greater-includes-
lesser argument). The greater-includes-the-lesser argument occasionally finds its
way into opinions of members of the Court other than Rehnquist, but it has also
been rejected often enough to raise doubts as to its general acceptance. See City of
Lakewood v. Plain-Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 762-68 (1988) (demon-
strating flaw in logic of "greater includes the lessser" argument); Vitek v.Jones, 445
U.S. 480, 490 n.6 (1980) (discussing superiority of constitutional due process over
statutory limitation of rights and repudiating Arnett v. Kennedy); Kreimer, supra
note 61, at 1309 n.46 (noting that Court has explicitly rejected "greater includes
the lesser" argument).
Fundamentally, the argument is at odds with the philosophical underpinnings
of the doctrine against prior restraint because the greater-includes-the-lesser argu-
ment depends heavily upon unconditional governmental prerogative to impose
conditions on individuals, thus reversing the prerogatives implicit in the doctrine
against prior restraint. For a discussion of the premises underlying the doctrine
against prior restraint, see supra notes 45-154 and accompanying text.
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most the beginning of the century.18 6 If it were sound logic, the
syllogism in the Rust case would look like this: (1) the state has the
power not to fund family planning clinics at all; (2) X is a family
planning clinic; (3) therefore, X family planning clinic is one upon
which the state may impose any condition whatsoever. But, as one
commentator noted, "[a]ll that can be deduced logically from the
power to deny a benefit absolutely is the power to deny it
absolutely."1 8 7
186. See Kreimer, supra note 61, at 1310 & n.54 (quoting Thomas Reed Pow-
ell, The Right to Work for the State, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 99, 110-11 (1916)) (asserting*
that "greater includes the lesser" argument has been questioned for 75 years).
187. Id. at 1310-11. Professor Baker sounded the same note when he wrote
that the foremost logical flaw in the argument is the assumption that a conditional
denial of a benefit is qualitatively identical to an absolute denial. Baker, supra note
158, at 1191. Professor Sunstein considered it an "implausible idea that the gov-
ernment's power not to create the program necessarily includes the power to im-
pose whatever condition it chooses." Sunstein, supra note 158, at 606. He
continued: "The Constitution limits the reasons for which government may act
and the effects of its actions. A welfare program limited to Democrats is unconsti-
tutional because of the first amendment [sic]; points about voluntary participation
and the 'greater power' are simply a diversion." Id.
Kreimer also pointed out that the argument looks only to the consequences of
government action, but many, if not most, constitutional constraints on govern-
ment concern procedure or method. The argument therefore is "wholly inappli-
cable" to the many cases where the constitution is directed at the means by which
government attains its ends. Kreimer, supra note 61, at 1311-12. Perhaps
Kreimer's most insightful critique of the argument, though, is that it depends on
the assumption that government could wield the greater power when it may be the
case, for either practical or political reasons, it actually cannot. Id. at 1313-14.
Despite the ruling in United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981), the supposedly greater power to abandon postal ser-
vice altogether does not justify a lesser power to prohibit private parties from using
mailboxes-because the power to abandon postal service can hardly even be called
theoretical under current conditions. See Kreimer, supra note 61, at 1313-14 &
n.65 (discussing government's theoretical alternative power). Similarly, the poten-
tial denial of all funding to family planning clinics may not justify conditioning
funding once granted because the former may be such a remote possibility in view
of political realities. As Professor Kreimer wrote, "[i] n reality, selective deprivation
may be the less controlled and hence the more dangerous power." Id. at 1313.
Finally, the greater-includes-the-lesser argument glosses over the issue of com-
parative injustice. It may be more constitutionally acceptable for the state to exer-
cise the greater power than to selectively discriminate against rightholders. No
unemployment compensation program may be preferable to one that would ex-
clude certain claimants because of their free exercise of religion. See Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (stating that while state can exercise control over its
unemployment program, it cannot deny benefits based on religion of claimant);
Kreimer, supra note 61, at 1312 (discussing psychological distinction between de-
nial to individual because of religion and knowledge that no unemployment pro-
gram exists). Likewise, it may be preferable not to fund family planning clinics at
all if the alternative was to create a scenario in which some patients could be ad-
vised of all their family planning options and others could not. See Roberts, supra
note 158, at 604 (discussing potential negative effects of biased information at Ti-
de X clinics as opposed to having to seek alternative information if there were no
such clinics).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist disposed of the viewpoint discrimina-
tion and unconstitutional conditions arguments, but he never ad-
dressed the argument that the regulation violated the doctrine
against prior restraint.188 Perhaps he thought the doctrine was ir-
relevant because the regulation did not fit the traditional adminis-
trative licensing or judicial order mold of prior restraints.
Although the regulation did not embody an explicit subsequent
punishment either, he may have thought it fell into that ambiguous
realm of speech restraints not susceptible to easy pigeonholing,
such as food stamp exemptions for strikers, 8 9 labeling require-
ments for foreign films considered propaganda, 190 zoning regula-
tions for adult bookstores,191 or second-class mail limitations. 92
Other than the fact that it was not a typical licensing system or
ajudicial injunction, however, the restraint at issue in Rust had the
same temporal quality of a prior restraint in that it explicitly
banned speech in advance of speaking, it emanated from govern-
ment, and it was aimed at certain content. Moreover, it violated the
premises underlying the doctrine against prior restraint. 193 If the
Rust Court had considered the operation and effect of the regula-
tion, as the Court did in Near v. Minnesota, this was a pristine prior
188. See Brief for Petitioners at 14, Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (No.
89-1391) ("Moreover, the regulations would unquestionably violate the First
Amendment's cardinal prohibition against prior restraints because they require
'assurances' in advance that the speakers conform their speech to this government-
composed script.").
189. See Lyng v. International Union of UAW, 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (holding
that statute denying eligibility for, or increase in, food stamps for striking workers
not unconstitutional prior restraint).
190. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987) (holding that governmental la-
beling of certain films as "political propaganada" is constitutional and does not
violate disseminators' First Amendment rights).
191. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (holding that
zoning ordinance restricting licensing of adult theaters not invalid as prior re-
straint as ordinance only regulates who receives licenses, not content of speech).
192. See Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946) (holding that postmaster
may not place restrictions on content of second-class mailings, provided material
is not obscene).
193. For a discussion of the premises underlying the doctrine against prior
restraint, see supra notes 45-154 and accompanying text. Thus, it was a red herring
for Chief Justice Rehnquist to compare the restraint to the establishment by Con-
gress of a National Endowment for Democracy with no obligation to fund pro-
grams encouraging communism or fascism. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194
(1991). The employees who work for the National Endowment for Democracy
certainly know what is expected of them and that they might lose their positions if
they deviate from the intent of the program, but there is no prior restraint as in
Rust in the sense of an explicit ban on certain content in advance of speaking. If
there were, it would likewise be unconstitutional. The government may speak, but
it may not abridge the individual autonomy of its citizens in doing so, and crucial
to that interest is a right to differ with one's government.
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restraint.1 94  Instead of allowing the near boundless spending
power of government to supersede the doctrine against prior re-
straint, the Court should have begun with an analysis of the injury
done by the regulation to the system of limited government. That
analysis would have been aided by express consideration of the reg-
ulation's harmony with the premises of distrust of government, 195
acceptance of risk inherent in speech 96 and regard for individual
autonomy.197
B. (Dis)Trusting the Government
The premise of trusting the individual rather than government
was sacrificed even as its praises were being sung. Toward the end
of the Rust Court's consideration of the First Amendment aspects of
the case, the majority sought to clarify that government funding is
not "invariably sufficient to justify* Government control over the
content of expression."1 98 The Court referred to traditional public
forums subsidized by government and traditional spheres of free
expression such as universities and possibly doctor-patient relation-
ships, the regulation of which would apparently merit stricter re-
view than the control in Rust.199 This has prompted at least one
194. For a discussion of the Near Court's analysis of the operation and effect
of the statute there at issue, see supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text. See also
Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2783 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
("[I]n some instances the operation and effect of a particular enforcement
scheme, though not in the form of a traditional prior restraint, may be to raise the
same concerns which inform all of our prior restraint cases: the evils of state cen-
sorship and the unacceptable chilling of protected speech.").
195. For a general discussion of the doctrine against prior restraint in relation
to distrust of government, see supra notes 47-50, 74-112 and accompanying text.
For an analysis of distrust of government in the Rust decision, see infra notes 198-
208 and accompanying text.
196. For a general discussion of the doctrine against prior restraint in relation
to acceptance of the risk inherent in speech, see supra notes 51-52, 114-33 and
accompanying text. For an analysis of this concept in the context of the Rust deci-
sion, see infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
197. For a general discussion of prior restraint in relation to respect for indi-
vidual autonomy, see supra notes 53-64, 134-54 and accompanying text. For an
analysis of this concept in the context of the Rust decision, see infra notes 213-38
and accompanying text.
198. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199 (1991).
199. Id. at 200.
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court2° ° and several commentators201 to suggest that the course of
free expression after Rust involves looking to see whether a
"sphere" of free expression is involved, thus invoking the traditional
skepticism toward government regulation. Putting aside whether
this approach would require a fundamental shift in the focus of
protection from the speech 20 2 to the speaker, however, it is not at
all clear that the Court was serious in its derogation of government
influence in such spheres.
The doctor-patient relationship was at the heart of Rust, yet the
Court found that "Title X program regulations do not significantly
impinge upon the doctor-patient relationship."203 The Court fur-
ther stated that a doctor's silence regarding abortion could not
"reasonably be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the
doctor does not consider abortion an appropriate option,"20 4 an
assertion for which no authority is offered, perhaps for good rea-
son.205 If the Court did not think it needed to decide whether this
potential "sphere" deserved protection from government regula-
tion in this case, it is not hard to imagine how the Court could
express its deference to government in future cases even while mak-
200. See Board of Trustees v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472 (D.D.C. 1991). In this
case, Stanford researchers funded by the National Institute of Health were re-
quired by terms of a grant to submit proposed publications on an artificial heart
device to the government for prior approval. The district court, while acknowledg-
ing that the ruling in Rust controlled the case, invalidated the condition because
the Rust condition applied specifically to the project and not to grantees (whereas
this condition bound researchers personally). Id. at 476. Additionally, the Rust
opinion exempted the university as a sphere of free expression to which different
rules would apply. Id. at 476-78.
201. See Cole, supra note 163, at 717. (discussing spheres of neutrality and in-
dependence); Fitzpatrick, supra note 163, at 218-20 (indicating there is exception
to Rust rationale for "traditional spheres of free expression").
202. See First Nat'l Bank v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (stating that con-
stitutional protection of speech does not depend on "identity of its source").
203. Rust, 500 U.S. at 200. Justice Blackmun considered this a "curious con-
tention." Id. at 211 n.3 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). The imposition of a substantial
burden on the doctor-patient relationship, he thought, was "beyond serious dis-
pute." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 200.
205. The American Medical Association is of the opposing view. See Hearing,
supra note 151, at 34-6 (statement of Raymond Scalettar, M.D., on behalf of AMA)
(stating that Rust gag-rule is unethical, abhorrent, unprofessional, unsound, and it
subjects physicians to legal liability). Justice Blackmun termed it "uninformed fan-
tasy" to think that a woman at a Title X clinic might expect that her doctor would
"withhold relevant information regarding the very purpose of her visit." Rust, 500
U.S. at 211 n.3 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). If speaking of abortion as one of several
options was considered approval of that option, not speaking of abortion as one of
the options cannot be considered approval and at least leaves open the possibility
of implied disapprobation.
1994] 863
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ing the obligatory nod toward individuals, spheres or whatever.2 06
To substitute the opinion of those in government for that of a doc-
tor illustrates a trust in government rather than the individual
doctor regarding the welfare of patients;20 7 it is government pater-
nalism in the extreme.208
C. "A Dangerous Idea"
An irony implicit in the regulation at issue in Rust was that si-
lence was considered inconsequential, but speech regarding abor-
tion must have been presumed to be compelling, necessitating its
complete abstinence. The mere mention df abortion might predis-
pose patients against all other alternatives or introduce them to an
option to which they would otherwise be oblivious. Such a risk was
apparently unacceptable.
The Court insisted that Rust was "not a case of Government
'suppressing a dangerous idea.' ",209 However, suppression of a dan-
gerous idea is almost a given in prior restraint cases, in that govern-
ment would not bother to suppress an idea it did not consider
dangerous to some degree. Especially in light of the express intent
behind the regulation to send a message "that the federal govern-
ment does not sanction abortion,"2 10 it seems disingenuous to claim
the government considered the idea to be innocuous. The majority
206. At least two justices have recognized the need for protection of the doc-
tor-patient relationship. See Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261, 340 n.12 (1990) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (arguing that "special relationship between patient and
physician" protected by due process clause); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 513
(1961) (DouglasJ., dissenting) (recognizing that right of doctor to advise patients
fully is obviously protected by First Amendment).
207. See Hearing, supra note 151, at 26 (statement of Floyd Abrams) ("[W]hile
the Court in Rust offers enormous deference to the executive branch ... it offers
no deference at all to First Amendment principles.").
208. The timeless observation of Justice Blackmun in Virginia St. Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counci4 Inc. exemplifies the opposite perspective:
[O]n close inspection it is seen that the State's protectiveness of its citi-
zens rests in large measure on the advantages of their being kept in igno-
rance ....
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic ap-
proach. That alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself
harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are
well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the
channels of communication rather than to close them .... It is precisely
this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and
the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment
makes for us.
425 U.S. 748, 769-70 (1976).
209. Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.
210. 53 Fed. Reg. 2944 (1988).
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seemed unwilling to recognize the wrenching controversy in this
country regarding abortion, with each side to the controversy con-
sidering the viewpoint of the other to be dangerous.211 As First
Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams observed in testifying before
Congress, "to say that a doctor cannot even answer a question about
abortion is to indicate the degree to which the writers of the regula-
tions considered that a dangerous idea."212
D. Compromising Individual Autonomy
Government can provide for speech in ways that preserve indi-
vidual autonomy.2 13 Rust v. Sullivan, however, illustrates the con-
trary proposition.
1. Government Speech
The aspect of the case that causes the most serious constitu-
tional concern is the government's deliberate effort to compromise
individual autonomy by placing conditions on Title X funds, as
surely as if it had licensed speech at family planning clinics. Both
the counseling that was authorized and the silence that was man-
dated took on the characteristic of government expression rather
than individual expression. As Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Leslie Southwick testified in a Senate hearing following Rust, when
"government funds a certain view, the government itself is speak-
ing."21 4 It follows, according to Southwick, that government could
211. Justice Blackmun was not hesitant to remind the majority, however. See
Rust, 500 U.S. at 215 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that "the abortion debate
is among the most devisive and contentious issues that our Nation has faced in
recent years").
212. Hearing, supra note 151, at 31 (testimony of Floyd Abrams); see also id. at
26 (statement of Floyd Abrams) (discussing government action in Rust as suppres-
sion of dangerous idea); Cole, supra note 163, at 688 n.47 (addressing issue as clear
example of law aimed at suppressing dangerous ideas).
213. Government already does so through maintenance of public forums and
subsidies. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (providing
and maintaining forum, Central Park bandshell, for expression); Hannegan v. Es-
quire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946) (providing subsidies for second-class mailing privilege);
see also Hearing, supra note 151, at 17 (statement of Lee C. Bollinger) (stating that
well-established public forum doctrine, which requires government to allocate
speech opportunities without regard to ideas or messages, is primary example of
constitutional choice to limit state's power to distort speech through use of public
property).
214. Hearing, supra note 151, at 11 (statement of Leslie H. Southwick); see also
Brief for the Respondent at 22-23, Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (No. 89-
1391) (arguing that government entitled to participate in public discourse and
may "contract out" production of its messages); Cole, supra note 163, at 676-77
(discussing content-based strings attached to federal funding); Hirt, supra note
163, at 1904-12 (advocating entitlement of government to restrict speech if associ-
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regulate the content of any message it sponsors. 215 The implica-
tions of such a premise are staggering. As Professor Rosenthal ob-
served, "[i] f the power to tie conditions to federal funds were really
unlimited, Congress could use the spending power to destroy bal-
ances achieved at the Constitutional Convention and in almost two
centuries of Supreme Court decisions .... ,216
When government speaks through individuals at the family
planning clinics, the fallacy, at least for First Amendment purposes,
is laid bare in the Rust Court's attempt to distinguish overt coercion
from selective subsidy: "There is a basic difference between direct
state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement
of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy."12 17 Yet,
any "legislative policy" that substitutes the views of the state for
those of individuals is a mockery of the concept of individual auton-
omy, whether the policy is couched in terms of interference or en-
couragement. Diversity of expression suffers if some of the
ostensibly private speakers actually are representing state ideology,
especially when they would express themselves differently but for
ated with government funding). Professor Sullivan concluded that the Rust Court
was treating government "as just another speaker who may decide what is to be
said on its nickel." Sullivan, supra note 169, at 46.
215. Hearing, supra note 151, at 13 (statement of Leslie H. Southwick).
216. Rosenthal, supra note 158, at 1105-06. A commentator offered some of
the possibilities for future government control of speech it subsidizes, including
restricting the National Endowment for the Arts to funding only art that promotes
"family values," appropriating money to public libraries only for works that do not
discuss abortion and revoking the second-class mailing privilege for magazines crit-
ical of the administration. Fitzpatrick, supra note 163, at 201; see also Cole, supra
note 163, at 687 (theorizing that government could create National Endowment
for Democratic Party Values to fund speakers, authors and artists). The logic of
Rust would seem to bring into question the holdings in a number of cases. See, e.g.,
Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946) (holding that second-class mailing
privilege criterion of "public character" does not convey discretion to Postmaster
to censor works with sexual theme); Bullfrog Films v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that it was unconstitutional for United States Information Agency
to issue educational certificates as prerequisites for customs duty exemption only
to films that advocated specific point of view, which USIA thought included those
promoting safety of nuclear power, but not those describing dangers); Big Mama
Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding it unconstitu-
tional for Internal Revenue Service to deny tax exemption because of magazine's
support for homosexual rights); American Council of the Blind v. Boorstin, 644 F.
Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1986) (finding it unconstitutional for Congress to direct Library
of Congress not to produce and distribute braille edition of Playboy because of its
sexual content).
Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Rust, wrote, "Under the majority's reasoning,
the First Amendment could be read to tolerate any governmental restriction upon
an employee's speech so long as that restriction is limited to the funded workplace.
This is a dangerous proposition, and one the Court has rightly rejected in the
past." Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 213 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
217. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977)).
866
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the intercession of the state.218
Private doctors whose salaries were not at all dependent on Ti-
tle X funds would enjoy complete freedom from any prior restraint
in discussing family planning options with their patients. The re-
straint that was imposed on would-be speakers skewed their rela-
tionship with government and to other speakers219 who were
privileged enough to avoid the censorship their government would
otherwise impose on them.220 In seventeenth century England, the
218. See Kreimer, supra note 61, at 1352-78. As part of an analysis of the con-
stitutionality of allocations affecting liberties, Professor Kreimer would have the
courts consider whether a government condition presents an offer or a threat
(does the individual end up with more or fewer choices?) and he suggests three
factors in reaching that conclusion: (1) history (has the benefit always been con-
ferred?); (2) equality (is the condition, withdrawal of benefit, etc. imposed selec-
tively?); and (3) prediction (what would happen if government could not impose
the condition in question or could not take the exercise of constitutional rights
into account?). Id. The factors are an improvement over traditional result-ori-
ented doctrines, and they may bear on whether the fundamental premises of free
speech, consistent with limited government, are subordinated. While grants
earmarked for certain purposes will always influence what speakers will say com-
pared to what they would have said, if the grant conditions specifically prohibit
certain content that the speakers otherwise would have expressed, the "predictive"
factor seems to indicate the government is deliberately targeting individual auton-
omy. Id.
219. See Sullivan, supra note 169, at 1490-99. Professor Sullivan argued that
"[p]reserving autonomous private decision-making not only promotes self-deter-
mination by rightholders; it also checks the power of the state. Ensuring that deci-
sions about rights remain to the greatest extent possible a matter of private
ordering preserves an equilibrium between public and private spheres." Id. at
1493 (footnotes omitted). Not only is democratic self-government undermined if
the state violates the rule of neutrality and some rightholders are subject to condi-
tions and others are not, but a constitutional caste system is created. Id. at 1496-
98; see also id. at 1490 ("[A] n unconstitutional condition can skew the distribution
of constitutional rights among rightholders because it necessarily discriminates
facially between those who do and those who do not comply with the condition.").
220. In its brief, the government attempted to draw an analogy between the
regulations prohibiting abortion counseling by Tide X recipients and a govern-
ment grant to produce a television documentary discussing family-planning tech-
niques, but not abortion. Brief for the Respondent at 22-23, Rust (No. 89-1391).
Professor Roberts contended, however, that the government's analogy grossly un-
dervalued the impact of the regulations at issue on the access of poor women to
abortion information. "The hypothetical that more accurately illustrates the injus-
tice of the regulations is a society where the dispossessed only have access to a
government television channel that broadcasts limited, misleading - even harm-
ful - information, while the privileged have their pick of channels that provide a
wealth of information." Roberts, supra note 158, at 608.
Professor Sullivan noted that a governmental obligation of neutrality or even-
handedness regarding private speech may leave intact very real inequities among
speakers. Sullivan, supra note 169, at 1497. However, the skewing caused by gov-
ernment "can be recognized and restrained even if inequality among rightholders
remains." Id. She analogized to antitrust law where perfect competitive equilib-
rium need not result. Likewise, "a right against government distortion need not
entail a right to government equalization.... [S]ome equity conditions restrain
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government doled out licenses as means of controlling publication;
now it doles out largesse.
2. The Systemic Consequences of "Choice"
Arguably, accepting largesse and the conditions attached to it
is different from applying for a license. At least in the former sce-
nario, the speakers are free to speak if they do not receive govern-
ment's grant, and they are only bound if they accede to the
conditions by accepting the money. Putting aside the dynamic that
it is in government's interest to bind as many people as possible by
distributing its largesse liberally, the issue in Rust seemed to center
on choice. The clinic could forgo the funds and retain all freedom,
at least in terms of negative liberty, or voluntarily accept the funds
and abide by the conditions. Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that
government did not violate the First Amendment "simply by offer-
ing that choice."221
As with the "legislative policy" of encouraging a particular view-
point at the expense of another, however, the "choice" is itself inva-
lid, no matter if government is characterized as beneficent, or the
prospective recipient as willing. The government cannot impose
prior restraint, in any guise, without overstepping its role in a repre-
sentative democracy. The Court focused on the individual preroga-
tive in making a choice,22 2 when the essential problem is with
government even in a constitutional order founded on negative rather than posi-
tive liberty." Id.
Professor Baker made the same point in noting that constitutional rights are
protected against government deterrence, but the state assumes no obligation to
address economic impediments in a market economy. Constitutional and statu-
tory entitlements, however, by their nature are positive rights and impose affirma-
tive obligations on government to address market barriers to facilitate the
realization of the rights. Baker, supra note 158, at 1219-20. Professor Baker also
acknowledged the argument that "background economic impediments, although
distinguishable, are as much a product of the State as its discrete laws, regulations,
and constitutional provisions." Id. at 1219 n.123. Seegenerally BRUCE M. OWEN, Eco-
NOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 27 (1975) (stating that Framers did not con-
template right to survival in marketplace for all potential purveyors of ideas);
Randall Bezanson, Herbert v. Lando, Editorial Judgment, and Freedom of the Press- An
Essay, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 605, 613, 615 (stating that ideas less likely to gain popular
acceptance relegated to forums of lesser circulation).
221. Rust, 500 U.S. at 199 n.5.
222. Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist stressed that the individuals were "voluntarily
employed" on a Title X project, and their freedom of expression only is limited
when they work for that project; "but this limitation is a consequence of their deci-
sion to accept employment in a project, the scope of which is permissibly restricted
by the funding authority." Id. at 199. Furthermore, a recipient of Title X funds
"voluntarily consents to any restrictions placed on any matching funds or grant-
related income." Id. at 199 n.5.
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government offering such a choice. 223 For government to bargain
for a waiver of the individual's freedom from prior restraint, which
protects the individual against government and which government
may not abridge outright, is to upset the constitutional scheme.
The right serves as a key counterweight to the power of government
in a system where power in the people is more than platitude.
Otherwise, government becomes a monopolist, fixing prices in the
marketplace of ideas.224
Thus, credible arguments have been made that rightholders
cannot make the choice to waive their First Amendment right, even
if the choice was offered.22 5 While on the face of it, a waiver would
Professor Baker provided a deft overview of the Court's labeling efforts in this
area:
The Court, in its search, has taken the perspective of the potential
beneficiary and has focused on the extent and type of burden presented
by the condition. Not surprisingly, given this perspective, the rhetoric of
individual 'choice' versus 'coercion' permeates its discussions. In deter-
mining which conditions are coercive and therefore impermissible, the
Court has explicitly looked to such characteristics as the 'directness' or
,substantiality' of the condition's impact, the likelihood that the condi-
tion will deter the exercise of a constitutional right, the 'germaneness' of
the condition to the purpose of the benefit program, and the 'impor-
tance' of the individual right or interest burdened. These concepts, how-
ever, are scarcely less determinate than the notions of coercion and
choice they are intended to delineate and define. Thus, one might con-
clude, at least at first glance, that the Court has simply relocated rather
than resolved the original problem.
Baker, supra note 158, at 1194-95 (footnotes omitted).
223. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 n.13 (1976) ("[T]o accept the
waiver argument is to say that the government may do what it may not do.").
224. Full credit is due Professor Kreimer for the wonderful analogy. See
Kreimer, supra note 61, at 1391 (analogizing government to monopolist).
225. See id. at 1378-92 (discussing inalienability of First Amendment rights);
Ronald Dworkin, Is the Press Losing the First Amendment?, NEW YoRK REVIEW, Dec. 4,
1980, at 49, 56-57 (addressing issue of unwaivable First Amendment rights); see also
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (stating that all men are endowed
with certain unalienable rights); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926) (holding that state may not impose conditions that
require relinquishing constitutional rights); Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) (holding that person cannot make agreement in advance to
forfeit their rights at some future time); Townsend v. Townsend, 7 Tenn. (Peck) 1,
12 (1821) (holding that constitutional rights may not be bartered or transferred
away and any such transfer is void); Kreimer, supra note 61, at 1383 n.323 (listing
sources which have analyzed issue of waiver of constitutional rights); Rosenthal,
supra note 158, at 1159-60 (asserting that Snepp case, where CIA agent required to
pay damages for violating secrecy agreement, was wrongly decided if decided as
employment contract case); Smolla, supra note 180, at 116 (arguing that recipients
of public largess who lack bargaining power cannot contract away their right to
procedural protection for same reason that contracts of adhesion are invalid).
However, the argument that First Amendment rights may not be waived is not
without its critics. Professor Baker suggested the fallacy is that there is no way of
telling which rights were inalienable or when they would be inalienable. Baker,
53
Helle: Prior Restraint by the Backdoor: Conditional Rights
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
870 VItoANOvA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39: p. 817
seem consistent with individual autonomy, Professor Kreimer dis-
agreed: "To the extent that a right is the result of a definition of
the structure and power of government, an individual decision to
waive it is irrelevant."226 The government is prohibited from con-
doning slavery, even should an individual want to waive his or her
Thirteenth Amendment right, because it denigrates the individual
supra note 158, at 1215. While that may be true generally of constitutional rights
(and Professor Baker dwells on cases involving public assistance benefits), it would
not seem to be so much of a problem with First Amendment speech and press
rights fundamental to effective representative democracy and integral to the con-
stitutional scheme.
Professor Sullivan observed that inalienability undercuts the autonomy it is
intended to promote. See Sullivan, supra note 169, at 1486 (arguing that declaring
constitutional right non-relinquishable may, in some circumstances, contradict
personal autonomy of rightholder to have control over right). Proponents of ina-
lienability may use social values as a rationale, overlooking the autonomous and
individual values at stake. Id. at 1487-88. Either wholesale alienability or inaliena-
bility is advocated, when the issue should be inalienability vis-a-vis government
without regard to waivers in the private sector. Id. One might respond, though,
that it is autonomy from government that the First Amendment contemplates and
it would not promote autonomy to waive it to become a vessel for government
speech. Secondly, both social and individual values support inalienability of First
Amendment rights, and thirdly, the First Amendment right is framed in opposi-
tion to government, which further supports its inalienability. However, Sullivan
does embrace a form of inalienability, based upon the "systemic effects that condi-
tions on benefits have on the exercise of constitutional rights." Id. at 1490. Rights
would only be inalienable up to the point where the conditions on benefits survive
strict review. Id. at 1490, 1499-1500.
Professor Cole thought inalienability was too blunt a tool because government
must commonly engage in content differentiation. Cole, supra note 163, at 700.
The example he gave involved hiring a spokesperson for the administration who,
he claimed, would be required to waive his or her right to criticize the administra-
tion. Id. One might suggest, though, that an administration spokesperson would
and should retain a right to criticize the administration and that any explicit provi-
sion to the contrary in an employment contract would indeed be unconstitutional.
Such criticism might well have consequences for the spokesperson, just as defama-
tion can have consequences, but administration spokespersons presumably hold
their tongues because of professional and political reasons and not because of any
prior restraint.
Professor Easterbrook employed an economic analysis in criticizing inaliena-
bility, concluding: "A right that cannot be sold is worth less than an otherwise-
identical right that may be sold. Those who believe in the value of constitutional
rights should endorse their exercise by sale as well as their exercise by other ac-
tion." Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiaty Privileges, and
the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. C. REv. 309, 347 (footnote omitted). Even
an advocate of economic analysis, though, might see the circularity in identifying
the "worth" or "value" of constitutional rights with the price they would bring
upon sale. Easterbrook's only discussion of systemic consequences of alienability
involved a refutation of the public's right to know, describing it as a "by-product"
of the right to speak and a creature of "invention rather than interpretation" of the
First Amendment. Id. at 350-51. This much might be granted, but it does not
constitute an exhaustive critique of the systemic effects of First Amendment
inalienability.
226. Kreimer, supra note 61, at 1387.
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worth integral to our system of government.22 7 Likewise, a caste
system of First Amendment rightholders and an underclass of the
dispossessed is antithetical to the democratic foundations of
society.228
Just as Blasi referred disparagingly to the "collective effect" that
consensual prior restraint could have for the allocation of authority
between the state and individual, 229 Professor Sullivan emphasized
the "systemic effects" of state conditions on constitutional rights:
"[P] referred constitutional liberties.., do not simply protect indi-
vidual rightholders piecemeal. Instead, they also help determine
the overall distribution of power between government and
rightholders generally, and among classes of rightholders."230 In
this sense, individual autonomy is preserved because it is essential
227. See Pollack v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 24 (1944) (holding that state may not
command involuntary servitude even if through voluntary contract); Bailey v. Ala-
bama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911) (finding compulsory service to work off debt, or
peonage, is involuntary servitude and unconstitutional under Thirteenth Amend-
ment, even if contract entered into voluntarily); see also Garrity v. NewJersey, 385
U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (holding that Fifth Amendment freedom from self-incrimina-
tion may not be waived as condition of employment as policeman).
228. See Kreimer, supra note 61, at 1387-88 (arguing that caste system is con-
trary to societal belief in free society); Sullivan, supra note 169, at 1490 (arguing
that unconstitutional conditions can create "undesirable caste hierarchy" between
those who do and do not depend on government benefits).
229. For a discussion of the "collective effect" of consensual prior restraint on
the allocation of authority between state and individual, see supra note 64 and
accompanying text.
230. Sullivan, supra note 169, at 1490; see Edward J. Fuhr, supra note 180, at
107, 117, 137-40, 152-53 & n.248 (stating that problem with interpreting condi-
tions as offers or threats is that at some point alienation of certain rights should be
limited because of structural effects, which is especially important in First Amend-
ment context).
Thus, the Pareto superiority test of welfare economics would be inapplicable
in the First Amendment context. Individuals may bargain for benefits and the
outcome is said to be Pareto superior if those who accept the conditions are better
off and nobody is worse off. A problem, however, is that the prerequisite that no
one else would be affected can rarely be fulfilled, and nowhere is that more true
than when the issue is waiver of First Amendment freedom from prior restraint.
The agreement to prior restraint alters the relationship not only between the
speaker and government, but between the speaker and all other speakers who have
not waived their right. Moreover, it begs the question of the initial distribution of
resources. Do you ask whether the family clinic is better off compared to a world
in which the State does not provide the benefit at all or one in which the State
provides the benefit without the attached condition? See Baker, supra note 158, at
1192-93 & n.14 (1990) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE
54-55 (1981)) (discussing problems associated with Pareto superiority test in con-
text of choice of unconstitutional conditions); Sunstein, supra note 158, at 606
n.48 (asserting that Paretian criteria hardly dispose of constitutional questions,
and waiver of rights may be individually rational but have significant adverse sys-
temic consequences-such as governmental purchase of right to vote or free
speech-undermining not only individual autonomy but certain forms of
government).
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to our constitutional commitment to limited government. Individ-
uals do not have the power to sacrifice their autonomy to govern-
ment because government does not have the power either to coerce
or induce that result.2 3 1
3. The Chimera of "Choice"
Beyond the constitutional implications, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's resort to "choice" as justification for the prior restraint in
Rust raises a question of logic. The label "choice" provides no rea-
son why First Amendment rights may be given up in the first place.
To say there is a choice is to assume the right may be waived. This
is the non sequitur that Professor Van Alstyne exposed in his classic
article on the demise of the right-privilege distinction.23 2 He ana-
lyzed Justice Holmes' oft-quoted 23 3 epigram from an 1892 case of a
policeman who was fired for political canvassing in violation of his
employment contract: "The petitioner may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a po-
231. Kreimer, supra note 61, at 1391 ("Most importantly, the government may
be barred from attempting to obtain waivers of constitutional rights ...."). Gov-
ernment should even be expected to resist the pressures exerted by individuals
who pursue their own advantage in waiving their individual rights. Individual lib-
erties such as speech, voting and even freedom of religion or freedom from search
may seem of little intrinsic worth to some individuals, especially compared to what
they may be able to gain in exchange for resources necessary for livelihood or
some other sense of security. In the case of voting rights, Professor Kreimer put it
eloquently:
It is advantageous for any given member of the least well-off group, if
votes are alienable, to sell her vote rather than use it to attempt to obtain
a public good for her group. If others sell their votes, she is no worse off
for having sold her vote, and if other members of her group retain their
votes and vote for the public good, she will obtain the good in any event.
On the other hand, if she retains her vote and her compatriots do not,
she will have gained nothing, and she knows that her compatriots, faced
with the same choices, will probably "rationally" choose to sell.
Id. at 1390 n.54; see also Fuhr, supra note 180, at 153 n.248 ("It is unlikely that
individual employees would value very highly their First Amendment rights,
though in the aggregate, the effect of such waivers could be immense."); Sullivan,
supra note 169, at 1482-83 (stating that due to political pressures, individuals may
feel compelled to bargain away rights that they would have collectively voted to
preserve under different factual situation).
232. Van Alstyne, supra note 158, at 1439.
233. A long list of commentators have cited Justice Holmes' quote. See, e.g.,
Baker, supra note 158, at 1190; Cole, supra note 163, at 676; Donald A. Dripps,
Delegation and Due Process, 1988 DuKE LJ. 657, 670; Epstein, supra note 180, at 10
n.14; Fuhr, supra note 180, at 100-01; Rosenthal, supra note 158, at 1120; Edward
L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. Rsv. 1044, 1051 n.38
(1984); Smolla, supra note 180, at 83; Peter Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of "Rights,"
33 UCLA L. REv. 977, 1010 (1986); Gary A. Winters, Note, Unconstitutional Condi-
tions as "Nonsubsidies": When Is Deference Inappropriate?, 80 GEo. L.J. 131, 141 n.46
(1991).
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liceman."23 4 The sentence might just as easily have read, "The
clinic doctor may have a constitutional right to counsel regarding
abortions, but she may choose government funding in lieu of that
right."
Van Alstyne highlighted the lack of a rationale in the sentence,
and further demonstrated that it was "perfectly circular" when
Holmes' own elastic conception of a "right" was taken into ac-
count.2 5 To Holmes, a right was not apparent on its face but only
represented "the fact that the public force will be brought to bear
upon those who do things said to contravene it."236 If one can be
stopped from violating it, then it is a right. Because those who fired
the policeman would not be stopped from firing him, he had no
right to be a policeman and talk politics; and because he had no
right to be a policeman and talk politics, those who fired him would
not be stopped, according to Van Alstyne.2 37 Or, in the present
case, because government would not be stopped from prohibiting
certain speech if it funded other speech, the clinic doctor has no
right to avoid the choice between funding and freedom from prior
restraint; and because she has no right to avoid the choice, the gov-
ernment would not be stopped from prohibiting certain speech if it
funded other speech. There is nothing per se constitutional about
choice, unless choice is predetermined to be constitutional-unless
it is predetermined that the public force will not be brought to bear
on those who impose the choice. In Rust, the proposition that one
could choose prior restraint was assumed, and the outcome was
therefore foreordained.238
234. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
235. See Van Alstyne, supra note 158, at 1459-60. According to Professor Wes-
ten, the right-privilege distinction is "untenable" because if constitutional rights
are to possess the significance society accords them, they must be as-
sumed to apply to the whole of human activity. That is to say, once a
government regulation arguably exerts an adverse effect on an interest
that underlies a constitutional entitlement, we expect the state to account
for, orjustify, such adverse effects, and the state cannot escape the obliga-
tion simply by announcing that the regulation falls within some arbitrarily
defined sphere of nonaccountability.
Peter Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the Forfei-
ture of Another, 66 IowA L. REv. 741, 747-48 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
236. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARv. L. REv. 40, 42 (1918),
quoted in Van Alstyne, supra note 158, at 1459.
237. SeeVan Alstyne, supra note 158, at 1460 (revealing circularity of Holmes'
argument by substituting in Holmes' definition of "right").
238. Individual choice as a justification for imposition of onerous conditions
by the state has a long history in the Supreme Court, dating to the dissents in the
Civil War loyalty oath cases, and the Court's initial consideration of state authority
to condition market access on corporate waiver of the federal guaranteed right of
access to federal courts. See Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 542 (1876)
1994] 873
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VI. THE DAY THE Music DIED
Floyd Abrams, in his congressional testimony, perceptively
characterized the essential problem with Rust:
There is another theme I would briefly offer .... It is
deliberately impressionistic. Or, to mix my metaphor a
bit, it relates to the music as well as the words of the
Court's opinion. It is this: Rust is a singularly insensitive
ruling, insensitive to the spirit as well as the letter of the
First Amendment. It is written as if the First Amendment
were little but a bother-a minor bother, perhaps, but
surely nothing more than an irritant that must mechanisti-
cally be dealt with en route to a long since predetermined
result.... The Court, in short, simply does not take seri-
ously the First Amendment issues raised by its decision.
That in itself makes the dangers of its ruling all the more
serious. 23 9
It is the music of the First Amendment and of the doctrine against
prior restraint that is missing in Rust and that this Article concerns.
Chief Justice Rehnquist simply, as he saw fit, defined the issue,
chose doctrine deferential to government, and laid the groundwork
for future deference in cases involving conditions on the right to
speak without prior restraint. At the same time, he glossed over the
concept of limited government in a paragraph tacked on to the end
of his First Amendment discussion.
Yet, he cannot totally be faulted for overlooking prior restraint
as the central issue in the case. The petitioner's brief and reply
brief mentioned prior restraint only once in their texts.240 Interest-
ingly, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,241
(holding statute constitutional which requires out of state business to contract
away its right to use federal courts for dispute resolution in order to obtain license
to do business in state); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 389-90 (1867)(Miller, J., dissenting) (arguing it is not constitutional violation to require loyalty
oaths of those who would accept office or practice law); see also Kreimer, supra note
61, at 1304 n.31 (providing list and classifications of cases where courts have de-
fended allocational sanctions on ground that victim retains choice of non-compli-
ance). The argument lost favor in corporate regulation in the early part of this
century, but continued to be effective in personal liberties cases through the mid-
part of the century and occasionally even in the present. Kreimer, supra note 61, at
1304 n.31.
239. Hearing, supra note 151, at 27 (testimony of Floyd Abrams).
240. Brief for Petitioners at 14, Rust v. Sullivan, 550 U.S. 173 (1991) (No. 89-
1391). The petitioners argued that the regulations at issue "proscribed" or "cen-
sored" speech of physicians. Id. at 14-15.
241. 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 417 (1994).
[Vol. 39: p. 817
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a later case quite similar to Rust, the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals accepted the plaintiff-appellants' argument that "content and
viewpoint discrimination imposes a prior restraint upon the ability
... to enjoy government largesse."2 42 The university offered fund-
ing for student activities, but exempted religious activities, includ-
ing the magazine dedicated to "Christian expression" that plaintiff-
appellants published.2 43 The court concluded that "the restriction
has operated to erect a prior restraint on university subsidization of
all forms of religious expression .... [W] hen funds are made avail-
able... generally, they must be distributed in a viewpoint-neutral
manner, absent considerations of equal constitutional dignity."244
Abortion and the free exercize of religion both enjoy constitu-
tional protection, and speech regarding each is protected. When
the government maintains a program of funding speech generally,
but specifically exempts otherwise protected speech on the basis of
its content, then the state action would contravene the premises
underlying the doctrine of prior restraint and, as such, be unconsti-
tutional. The regulation in Rust should have been identified as a
prior restraint, just as the restriction in Rosenberger was.2 45 It is easy
242. Id. at 279.
243. Id. at 273-74.
244. Id. at 280-81.
245. Actually, the defendant-appellees in Rosenberger placed "great emphasis"
on the Supreme Court's decision in Rust. Id. at 282 n.28. The Fourth Circuit,
however, found Rust inapposite because the petitioners in Rust had already re-
ceived funding, while the appellants in Rosenbergerwere denied access to funding at
the outset. Id. A clearer focus on the viewpoint-restrictive nature of the govern-
ment funding ban in both cases would have established the similarity, though.
The dissimilarity in the cases involves the complicating factor of the Establish-
ment Clause in Rosenberger, requiring separation of church and state. See id. at 281-
82 (noting defendant-appellees' concern that they could not fund religious activi-
ties without violating the Establishment Clause). The Fourth Circuit assumed that
it had to consider whether a compelling state interest, narrowly drawn to achieve
that end, justified the regulation of content. Id. at 281 (citing Arkansas Writers'
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (using strict scrutiny to find sales tax
exemption for periodicals based on content to be unconstitutional); see also supra
note 180 (suggesting this analysis for conditions imposed by state subsidies on
speech generally, although not if condition constituted prior restraint). Not all
agree that such balancing is appropriate in cases of content regulation. See Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (Ken-
nedyJ., concurring) (contending that the compelling state interest test is derived
from equal protection analysis and regulation of protected speech content should
not be subject to balancing, but considered unconstitutional). A per se finding of
unconstitutionality would be consistent with the historical treatment of prior re-
straint. See supra note 90 (noting that before Near, doctrine against prior restraint
considered unqualified and without exception). For a discussion of Blackstone's
definition of a realm of speech protected from previous restraint and another
realm of speech unprotected from subsequent punishment, see text accompanying
supra note 19.
The Fourth Circuit found that subsidizing the plaintiff-appellants' magazine
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to criticize with the advantage of hindsight, and ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist could have defined the issue in Rust as not involving prior
restraintjust as easily as he did in a more recent case. 24 However, a
more forthright assertion of prior restraint as the central issue in
the Rust case and an appeal to the time-honored premises underly-
ing the doctrine against prior restraint would have been truer to
the "music" of the First Amendment. No composition on the First
Amendment generally, and the doctrine against prior restraint spe-
cifically, is complete without consideration of the three premises of
limited government integral to the doctrine-trust in the individ-
ual rather than government, acceptance of the risk inherent in de-
mocracy, and regard for individual autonomy from the state.
The premises apply equally well to conditional prior restraint
cases other than Rust. Some allowances might be made for condi-
tional prior restraints on speech by CIA agents247 or politicians who
are offered campaign funding,248 but I sincerely doubt it. The only
difference may be that different premises-acceptance of risk in
the case of the CIA agents249 and distrust of government meddling
would "excessively entangle" the university with religion, thus creating a compel-
ling interest justifying the prior restraint. Rosenberger, 19 F.3d at 286.
Curiously, the petitioners distinguished their case from Rust v. Sullivan in ar-
guing to the Supreme Court; their brief made no mention of the doctrine against
prior restraint. See Brief for Petitioners, Rosenberger v. Rector& Visitors of Univ. of Va.
(No. 94-329) (positing that status of family planning clinics in Rust as "conduits for
government messages" made to grantees' speech subject to reasonable govern-
ment restrictions).
246. SeeAlexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993) (finding forfeiture
of entire inventory of non-obscene magazines and videotapes after conviction
under RICO for seven obscene items is subsequent punishment and poses no ob-
stacle to future speech).
247. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (upholding agreement
not to divulge classified information without authorization).
248. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976) (per curiam) (characteriz-
ing Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as "a congressional effort, not to
abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and
enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral process").
249. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 514-15. Snepp was a case of risk aversion, with the
majority highly sensitive to probing into confidential matters. Id. The risk of prior
restraint was never addressed. At least one author has suggested that the reason
for pre-publication clearance programs and the risk to which the government was
most clearly averse was embarrassment caused by whistleblowers. See Fuhr, supra
note 180, at 146-47 (expressing point that government has desire to avoid situation
where employees may sabotage programs by releasing information for public de-
bate); see also Smith, supra note 1, at 468-69 (recognizing that much of what Ameri-
cans know concerning perilous or provocative acts by their government has come
from reporting of classified or otherwise concealed information). Fuhr pointed
out that pre-publication review is most ineffective in the cases in which it would be
most needed, and that unauthorized disclosure of classified information is already
covered by criminal penalties. Fuhr, supra note 180, at 145. The need for a solu-
tion is dubious because there has not been shown to be a significant problem. See
876 [Vol. 39: p. 817
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regarding political speech 2 50-merit the type of prominent consid-
eration denied individual autonomy in Rust. When the Court
strikes a discordant note, as it did in Rust, one can only hope that it
was a postmodernistic foray in a developing area of law and that the
classical approach will ultimately prevail. The venerable age of the
doctrine against prior restraint, dating well before the First Amend-
ment, does not guarantee its survival, however, and new, more so-
phisticated incursions will always be attempted. Allowing
government to buy what it may not coerce represents just such an
incursion and the reasoning and holding in Rust indicate that the
threat is real. Creative use of the government's power of the purse
could marginalize the doctrine against prior restraints if the Court
chooses to ignore the threat to speech posed by unlimited govern-
ment. Debates over whether the Framers intended subsequent
punishment or just prior restraint to be proscribed by the First
Amendment will then truly be only academic.
The regulation at issue in Rust was not a subsequent punish-
ment or any esoteric speech restriction. It was a prior restraint. It
struck at the core understanding of what the First Amendment
meant when it was written, and it depreciated the individual ration-
ality central to our form of government. If a Supreme Court major-
ity does not develop an appreciation for the richly nuanced
harmonics of the First Amendment in our constitutional scheme
and of the doctrine against prior restraint in cases of conditioned
speech rights, then the doctrine, like Mozart's grave, may be lost.
id. at 145 & n.221 (stating that GAO study to Congress showed few unauthorized
disclosures, most made by officials who would not be covered by proposed review
program). Reliance on subsequent punishment would decrease the likelihood of
government harassment of employees who voice critical views. Id. at 150-51.
250. See L. A. Powe, Jr., Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 Sup.
CT. REv. 243, 252-54, 283-84 (discussing distrust of government in arena of cam-
paign financing and mass speech).
1994] 877
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